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STILL MORTGAGING THE AMERICAN DREAM:
PREDATORY LENDING, PREEMPTION,
AND FEDERALLY SUPPORTED LENDERS
JuliaPattersonForrester'

This Article discusses the continuing problem of predatory lending
abuses in the subprime home mortgage lending market and federal
and state attempts to address the problem. Over the protests of
consumer advocates, federal agencies have recently issued
regulationspreempting state predatory lending statutes as applied to
national banks and thrifts. In addition, Congress is considering
legislation that would preempt state predatory lending laws for all
lenders. The Article considers the preemption debate, particularly in
the context of federally supported lenders-banks, thrifts, and the
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. Banks and thrifts receive support through the federalsafety net,
which includes deposit insurance. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are
federally chartered,privately owned corporations that receive other
types offederal support. The Article concludes that preemption is not
warrantedfor nationalbanks and thrifts orfor other lenders, and that
banks, thrifts, and the GSEs should be part of the solution to the
predatory lending problem by originating, purchasing, and/or
securitizing subprime loans in compliance with state andfederal law.

INTRODUCTION

Citigroup is one of the largest financial services companies in the
world.1 Its retail banking group, operating under the name Citibank,
includes a number of national banks with federal charters.2 Citigroup
* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law, Dallas, Texas;
B.S.E.E. 1981, J.D. 1985, The University of Texas at Austin. I wish to thank Paul Rogers, Elizabeth
Thornburg, Ken Elmgren, Joe Norton, Bernhard Grossfeld, and Mary Spector for their comments on
drafts of this Article; Laura Justiss for her assistance as a research librarian; and Reza Calili, Derek
Dansby, Irene Golden, Peter Niebyl, Joshua Somers, Chris Wilmoth, and especially Anne Countiss for
their research assistance. In addition, I gratefully acknowledge the research grant provided by Southern
Methodist University Dedman School of Law.
1. See Hoover's In-Depth Company Records, Citigroup Inc. (June 14, 2006), availableat 2006
WLNR 10167212.
2. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, NATIONAL BANKS ACTIVE AS OF
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and Citibank have been affiliated with a subprime lender3 that engaged
in predatory mortgage lending practices.
Associates First Capital (Associates) was notorious for its predatory
lending practices in 2000 when Citigroup purchased the company.4
Associates was at the time "under investigation by the Federal Trade
Commission and the Justice Department as epitomizing 'predatory'
tactics that strip away equity in homes of unsophisticated borrowers by
making loans with deceptive terms and fees."5 Associates' practices
included: making loans with high interest rates, large upfront fees,
balloon payments, and prepayment penalties; aggressively selling
single-premium credit insurance; and "flipping" or refinancing loans to
generate additional fees without benefit to the borrower. 6 Employees of
Associates were under intense pressure to sell credit life insurance, and a
subsidiary had collected $900 million in revenue from credit insurance
premiums over the five years prior to the Citigroup purchase, in at least
one year selling credit insurance on fifty-seven percent of its real estate
loans.7 Consistent with its practice of "flipping" loans, Associates even8
refinanced zero-interest loans made through Habitat for Humanity.
Citigroup promised reforms, but its consumer finance company,
Citifinancial, which would eventually take over the Associates branches,
planned to continue charging prepayment penalties, selling single
premium credit life insurance, and requiring arbitration clauses in its
loans. 9
In March 2001, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sued

5/31/2006, http://www.occ.treas.gov/foia/nblistName St CityBankNet.pdf.
3. Subprime lenders are lenders who make subprime loans, which are loans to borrowers with a
higher credit risk. See infra notes 43-53 and accompanying text for a more extensive discussion of
subprime lending.
4. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Patrick McGeehan, Along With a Lender, Is Citigroup Buying
Trouble?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000, at 31 [hereinafter CitigroupBuying Trouble]; Richard A. Oppel,
Jr. & Patrick McGeehan, Citigroup Revamps Lending Unit To Avoid Abusive Practices, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2000, at Cl [hereinafter Citigroup Revamps]. Martin Eakes, the founder of a nonprofit
community lender in North Carolina, is quoted as saying, "It's
simply unacceptable to have the largest
bank in America take over the icon of predatory lending." Citigroup Buying Trouble, supra, at 31. See
also infra Part V.A (discussing the involvement of bank affiliates in predatory lending).
In 1996, Associates had purchased Fleet Finance, another notorious predatory lender. See Tony
Munroe, Fleet Unloads Finance Unit, BOSTON HERALD, July 2, 1996. In 1993 and 1994 Fleet Finance
had paid over $100 million in settlement of allegations that it had engaged in predatory lending practices
in Georgia. Id.
5. See CitigroupRevamps, supra note 4, at C 1.
6. See Citigroup Buying Trouble, supra note 4, at 31. See also infra Part I (describing the
practice of predatory lending).
7. See CitigroupBuying Trouble, supranote 4, at 31.
8. See id.
9. See CitigroupRevamps, supra note 4, at Cl.
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Associates as well as Citigroup and Citifinancial as its successors,
alleging that Associates had violated the Federal Trade Commission Act
by engaging in deceptive practices to induce consumers to purchase
credit insurance and refinance existing home mortgage loans into new
high interest rate loans with high fees.10 At the time, Citigroup stressed
its commitment to resolving problems and implementing changes in the
former Associates branches. 1 In September 2002, Citigroup reached a
settlement with the FTC, agreeing to pay $215 million to customers of
Associates who had purchased credit insurance between December 1,
1995, and November 30, 2000,12 the date on which Citigroup finalized
its purchase of Associates. 13 The settlement was made contingent on
approval of the settlement of a class action lawsuit in California
providing for payment of an additional $25 million to consumers who
refinanced with Associates during that same time
period. 14 The
15
settlement was the largest ever reached by the FTC.
Through the pendency and after settlement of the FTC suit, Citigroup
continued to insist that the problems were with the old Associates and
that it was instituting reforms. 16 However, in May 2004, the Federal
Reserve ordered Citifinancial to pay a $70 million penalty for lending
abuses that occurred in 2000 and 2001.17 The Federal Reserve asserted
that Citifinancial made home equity loans without adequately
determining the ability of borrowers to repay the loans. 18 The penalty
was the largest ever assessed by the Federal Reserve for violations of
consumer lending laws.19 More recently, Citigroup disclosed that it had
made hundreds of high-cost loans even after adopting a policy of no

10. See News Release, Federal Trade Commission, Citigroup Settles FTC Charges Against the
Associates: Record-Setting $215 Million for Subprime Lending Victims (Sept. 20, 2002),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/09/associates.htm [hereinafter FTC News Release].
11. See Richard A. Oppel Jr., U.S. Suit Cites Citigroup Unit on Loan Deceit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
7, 2001, at Al.
12. See FTC News Release, supra note 10.
13. See Citigroup Closes Associates Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at C12.
14. See FTC News Release, supra note 10.
15. See id.
16. Citigroup stopped doing business with about twenty percent of the brokers who brought
business to Associates, Richard A. Oppel Jr., Citigroup Takes Action Against Brokers at Consumer
Loan Unit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2001, at Cl, and agreed to stop selling single-premium credit
insurance, opting instead to allow borrowers to pay monthly premiums, Patrick McGeehan, Citigroup
Set to End Tactic on Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2001, at Cl.
17. See Timothy L. O'Brien, Fed Assesses Citigroup Unit $70 Million in Loan Abuse, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 2004, at C I [hereinafter FedAssesses Citigroup].
18. See id.
19. See id.
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longer making such loans.20 Associates is still a subsidiary of the
holding company, Citigroup, 2 12 2but Citifinancial absorbed Associates'
lending operations into its own.
Citibank is not the only bank affiliated with a subprime lender
accused of predatory lending abuses. In 2002, Household International,
an affiliate of HSBC Bank USA, 23 agreed to pay $484 million to settle
allegations by states that it had engaged in predatory lending practices.2 4
In addition, Bank of America, Bank One, J.P. Morgan Chase, Fleet
Bank, and Wells Fargo, or affiliates of these banks, have all been sued
based on allegations of predatory lending abuses.25
In April 2005, the New York attorney general began investigating
Citigroup as well as J.P. Morgan Chase, HSBC, Wells Fargo, and other
national banks and their operating subsidiaries to determine whether
they made high-cost loans to minority homeowners who could qualify
for lower-cost loans.2 6 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) and a coalition of national banks, including those being
investigated, filed separate lawsuits to block the investigation. 27 The

20. See Eric Dash, CitigroupUnits Kept Making Loans that Violated Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
2005, at C9. The high-cost loans covered by Citigroup's policy are defined in the Home Ownership and
Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1602 (2000)).
21. See Citigroup, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), Exhibit 21.01, at 2, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831101/000104746906002377/a2l67745zex-21-01.htm
or at
http://tinyurl.com/nltpv.
22. See Fed Assesses Citigroup, supra note 17, at Cl. Citifinancial is also a subsidiary of
Citigroup. See Citigroup, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), Exhibit 21.01, supra note 21, at 10-12.
23. See Hoover's In-Depth Company Records, HSBC USA Inc. (June 7, 2006), available at
2006 WLNR 9730670.
24. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-280, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND
STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING, REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING, U.S. SENATE 4 (2004),
availableat hup://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
25. See NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., COMMENTS OF THE CONSUMER FEDERATION OF
AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES, AND U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH
GROUP TO OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC DOCKET NO. 03-16, BANKING
ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS; REAL ESTATE LENDING AND APPRAISALS (Oct. 6, 2003), available at
http://www.nclc.org/initiatives/test and comm/10_6_occ.shtml [hereinafter NCLC COMMENTS]; Arthur
E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority and Presenta Serious
Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225,
315 (2004).
26. See Eric Dash, New York Begins Inquiry into PossibleMortgage Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
2005, at C2; Eric Dash, Banks File Suit to Stop Spitzerfrom Looking at Lending Data,N.Y. TIMES, June
17, 2005, at C8 [hereinafter Banks File Suit]; Court Blocks Spitzer Inquiry into Loan Data,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 2005, at C3.
27. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency v. Spitzer (OCC), 396 F. Supp. 2d 383
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); Clearing House Ass'n v. Spitzer, 394 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Banks File
Suit, supranote 26, at C8.
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U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York concluded
that federal regulations give OCC the exclusive right to exercise
visitorial powers over federal banks and their operating subsidiaries, and
enjoined the New York attorney general from continuing the
investigation.2 8 That decision is under appeal.29
Home ownership is still the American dream, 30 which more
Americans than ever are realizing. 31 Predatory lending practices and the
foreclosures that result, however, undermine that dream. The federal
government has played and continues to play a significant role in
promoting home ownership by supporting the home mortgage market,
offering tax incentives to homeowners, and attempting to make home
mortgage financing more available and less expensive. 32 Some of the
government's efforts to assist home mortgage lenders and support the
mortgage market, however, harm the very homeowners that they are
ultimately intended to benefit. 33 Recently, the federal government is
thwarting efforts of state legislators to protect homeowners in their
states by preempting state statutes regulating predatory lending abuses.
Regulations preempt state predatory lending statutes applicable to
national banks and savings associations (also called thrifts), and
proposed legislation would preempt the statutes altogether.
This Article addresses the preemption debate, particularly in the
context of federally supported lenders-banks, thrifts, and the
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie

28. See OCC, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 403.
regulations and defining visitorial powers).

See also infra Part IV.A (discussing the new OCC

29. See Christopher Conkey, States Shelter Risky Borrowers-Legislatures Battle Predatory
Lenders as Washington Debates Issue, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2006, at A4 [hereinafter States Shelter
Risky Borrowers].
30. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., HOMEOWNERSHIP IS A NATIONAL PRIORITY

(2005), http://www.hud.gov/initiatives/homeownership/index.cfm.
See also Joan Williams, The
Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REv. 277, 326-27 (1998) (discussing the American obsession with
homeownership).
31. See U.S. DEP'T. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T. OF TREASURY, CURBING
PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT REPORT 13 (2000), http://www.hud.gov/library/

bookshelfl 8/pressrel/treasrpt.pdf [hereinafter HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT] (stating that 67.1% of
American families own a home).
32. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A CriticalEvaluation of the
FederalGovernment's Promotion of Home Equity Financing,69 TUL. L. REv. 373, 394 (1994).
33. Federal law encourages both borrowers and lenders to structure consumer debt as a home
equity loan secured by the borrower's home. Furthermore, federal law preempts state usury laws and
laws governing alternative mortgage transactions, thus permitting high interest rates and other unfair
terms in home equity loans despite state law to the contrary. Finally, federal bankruptcy law, which
otherwise could give some relief to debtors, requires a debtor to pay a home equity loan in full on its
original terms to avoid foreclosure. See id. at 432-35.
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Mac.34 The Article concludes that preemption is not warranted, even for
national banks and thrifts, and argues that banks, thrifts, and the GSEs
should be part of the solution to the predatory lending problem by
operating in the subprime mortgage market in compliance with both
state and federal law.
Part I of this Article discusses the continuing problem of predatory
lending. Minority, elderly, and low-income homeowners are still being
victimized by unscrupulous lenders, mortgage brokers, and contractors.
They pay too much for credit, obtain loans they cannot afford, and in
some cases lose their homes.35
Part II explores the efforts of state and federal lawmakers and
enforcers to address the predatory lending problem. In 1994, Congress
passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA or the
Act),36 and many states have since enacted statutes designed to further
Lenders,
protect their citizens from predatory lending abuses.3 7
however, are opposed to state predatory lending statutes and have
pressed federal lawmakers to preempt state law.
Part III examines the possible causes of the predatory lending
problem. While the issues are complex and the precise causes hard to
determine, changes over the last thirty years in the operation of the
mortgage market for both prime and subprime loans have been a major
contributing factor. While these changes have served the prime market
well, they have increased the likelihood that subprime borrowers will be
victimized. Investors in home mortgages can purchase predatory loans,
turn a blind eye to dishonest originators, and hide under the holder-indue-course doctrine and the securitization process to avoid loss and
liability. A major increase in the availability of subprime credit has
opened the door to predatory lenders, and market failures have kept
honest subprime lenders from driving the dishonest ones out of the
market. Finally, federal preemption of state consumer protection
measures has prevented states from responding to the full extent
possible.
Part IV discusses recent developments in the federal preemption of
state predatory lending laws as well as the validity of regulatory
attempts at preemption. In January 2004, the Office of the Comptroller

34. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are privately owned government-sponsored entities that
support the mortgage market by purchasing and securitizing home mortgage loans. See infra Part V.B
for a discussion of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
35. See infra Part I.

36. Pub. L. No. 103-325, tit. 1, subtit. B, 108 Stat. 2160 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1648
(2000)).
37. See infra Part II.B.
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of the Currency (OCC) announced that federal banking law preempts
state predatory lending statutes as applied to national banks and their
operating subsidiaries.3 8 The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) had
previously issued a similar determination with respect to federal savings
associations. 39 In addition, a bill currently before Congress would
preempt state predatory lending statutes altogether.40
Part V discusses the involvement of federally supported lendersbanks, thrifts, and government-sponsored enterprises-in the subprime
and predatory lending markets. Banks, thrifts, and the GSEs have taken
vastly different approaches to the subprime mortgage market and the
predatory lending problem. Federal banks and thrifts are involved in the
subprime mortgage market and in some cases make or profit indirectly
from predatory loans. Banks and thrifts have sought and obtained
protection from state predatory lending initiatives through federal
preemption. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, on the other hand, have
become increasingly involved in the purchase and securitization of
subprime loans while adhering to guidelines designed to prevent their
purchase of predatory loans. Both have successfully operated under the
patchwork of state mortgage law for many years and the more recent
patchwork of predatory lending laws emerging in an increasing majority
of the states.
Part VI argues that the federal government should not preempt state
predatory lending law. Both real estate finance and consumer protection
have traditionally been areas governed by state rather than federal law.
In recent years when the federal government has intervened in these
areas, federal statutes and regulations have typically created a minimum
standard for consumer protection rather than preempting the field of
regulation. When state governments regulate, they can be more
responsive to the needs of their citizens and innovative in trying new
solutions. State enforcers are more likely to prosecute small actors in
predatory lending that federal enforcers may ignore.
This Article asserts that varying state laws are not as onerous on
lenders as they may claim. Since subprime loans tend to be originated
by local mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers, the originators can
comply with local law, and investors can police their originators and
purchase only from those that do comply with local law. The states
already have varying laws governing real estate finance; therefore,

38. See infra notes 271-92 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 262-70 and accompanying text.
40. See infra Part IV.B.
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adding additional requirements is only a matter of revising forms and
standards that already differ from state to state. Furthermore, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac can further their regulatory goals of leading the
market in loans to low- and moderate-income families and in low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods by participating in the subprime
market to a greater extent and setting standards for compliance with
each state's law.
Federal attempts to curb the predatory lending problem have thus far
been unsuccessful. As a result, state legislatures have reacted to the
problem by enacting statutes aimed at protecting consumers in their
states. This Article argues that the federal government should not tie the
hands of state legislatures and state attorneys general who are trying to
combat mortgage lending abuses because predatory lending is still a
problem.

I. THE PROBLEM OF PREDATORY

LENDING

Predatory lending is alive and well, 4 ' as the lawyers in the trenches in
legal aid offices across the country can attest. Despite federal and state
statutory measures aimed directly at curbing the problem, homeowners
are still victimized. In fact, the incidence of predatory lending has
increased since Congress enacted HOEPA in 1994.42
Predatory lending must be distinguished from subprime lending.
Subprime loans are loans with a higher risk of default because of the

41. See GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 23-25; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31,
at 22. In March of 2000, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Andrew Cuomo formed the
National Task Force on Predatory Lending.
Id. at 13-14.
Task force members included
"representatives of consumer advocacy groups; industry trade associations representing mortgage
lenders, brokers, and appraisers; local officials; and academics." Id. at 14. Recommendations in the
HUD/Treasury Joint Report are based in significant part on information gathered by the task force. Id.
at 13.
42. See Legislative Solutions to Abusive Mortgage Lending Practices: Hearing Before the
Subcomms. on FinancialInstitutions and Consumer Credit and Housing and Community Opportunity of
the H. Comm.
on Financial Services,
109th
Cong.
1
(2005),
available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/ media/pdf/052405me.pdf
[hereinafter Hearing on Legislative
Solutions] (statement of Martin Eakes, Chief Executive Officer, Self-Help and the Center for
Responsible Lending) ("As the subprime mortgage market has boomed, climbing from $35 billion to
$530 billion in the decade through last year, so too have abusive loans, which are concentrated in this
market."); Predatory Mortgage Lending: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 398 (2001) [hereinafter Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending]
(statement of Mike Shea, Executive Director, ACORN Housing Corp.); 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604 (Dec. 20,
2001) ("With this increase in subprime lending there has also been an increase in reports of 'predatory
lending."').
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credit characteristics of the borrowers.4 3 Borrowers may be a higher
credit risk because of their delinquencies, foreclosures, bankruptcies,
debt-to-income ratios, or other factors. 4 Because of the greater risk of
default by these borrowers, subprime loans carry higher interest rates

than prime loans.45 Even within the subprime market, interest rates vary
according to risk.46 Subprime loans are classified according to risk as
A- (lowest risk), B, C, or D (highest risk),4 7 with interest rates varying
from about half a point to as much as four points above prime rates.48

Most subprime lenders provide a valuable service by giving
borrowers access to credit to buy homes, make home improvements, or
borrow against the equity in their homes for other purposes.49 In the
past, almost all subprime loans were either home equity loans or home
improvement loans; but in recent years, subprime lenders have also
entered the purchase-money loan market.50 Most subprime loans,
however, are still made for the purposes of refinancing, debt

consolidation, or general consumer credit. 1 Subprime loans used to be
primarily second lien loans, but today they are predominantly first lien

43. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., & OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, EXPANDED GUIDANCE
FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 2 (2001) [hereinafter EXPANDED GUIDANCE]; Hearing on
Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 42, at 311 (statement of John A. Courson, Vice President,
Mortgage Bankers Association), 345-46 (statement of David Berenbaum, National Community
Reinvestment Coalition).
44. EXPANDED GUIDANCE, supranote 43, at 2-3.
45. See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 27.
46. See id.at 28.
47. Id. at 33.
These grades are not well defined across the industry, but an "A-minus" borrower may
have good credit generally but has had some minor payment delinquencies in the past
year. A "C" or "D" borrower may have a marginal or poor credit history, including
multiple payment delinquencies in the past year or past bankruptcies.
Id. at 33-34. Prime loans are classified as A loans. Id. at 33.
48. Id. at 28. Underwriting standards are not uniform among subprime lenders. JOHN C.
WEICHER, THE HOME EQUITY LENDING INDUSTRY: REFINANCING MORTGAGES FOR BORROWERS WITH
IMPAIRED CREDIT 13, 34 (Hudson Institute 1997). Weicher's report states:
In sharp contrast to the prime mortgage market, there are no generally accepted
underwriting guidelines for the subprime home equity lenders. Individual firms set their
own guidelines. They typically take the same factors into consideration but set different
criteria to qualify for a given credit grade. Hence, one firm's B loans may look like
another's C loans. Underwriting appears to be an art rather than a science ....
Id. at 13.
49. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 2-3.
50. See id at 30.
51. Id.; WEICHER, supra note 48, at 31.
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loans.52 While most subprime
loans are not predatory, predatory loans
53
subprime.
always
are almost
Predatory loans are characterized by high interest rates and points that
exceed the amount necessary to cover the lender's risk,54 excessive fees
and closing costs that are usually financed as part of the loan,55 frequent
refinancing or "loan flipping" with additional points and fees, 56 lending
based on home equity without regard to the borrower's ability to
repay,5 7 and outright fraud.58 Borrowers are often required to refinance

52. See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 30, 47. Most home mortgage loans
are not subject to state usury limitations because federal law preempts state usury limitations for
"federally related" loans secured by a first lien on residential real property in most states. See infra
notes 235-45 and accompanying text.
53. See GAO REPORT, supranote 24, at 4; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 12; Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 42, at 311-12 (statement of John A. Courson,
Vice President, Mortgage Bankers Association), 346 (statement of David Berenbaum, National
Community Reinvestment Coalition), 398 (statement of Mike Shea, Executive Director, ACORN
Housing Corp.).
54. See GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 3; Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 3
(statement of Stella Adams, Board Member, National Community Reinvestment Coalition); Hearingon
Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 42, at 346 (statement of David Berrenbaum, National
Community Reinvestment Coalition), 296 (statement of Esther Canja, President, American Association
of Retired Persons). Homeowners may pay interest rates as high as twenty-nine percent per annum.
See, e.g., Hearingon Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 4 (statement of Martina Guilfoil, Executive
Director, Inglewood Neighborhood Housing Services). They may pay points totaling as much as thirtythree percent of the amount financed. See Problems in Community Development Banking, Mortgage
Lending Discrimination,Reverse Redlining, and Home Equity Lending: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 447 (letter from Elizabeth
Renuart, Managing Att'y, St. Ambrose Legal Services, to Sen. Donald W. Riegle Jr. (Feb. 17, 1993))
[hereinafter 1993 Hearingson Problems in Lending].
55. See GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 3; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 2,
21; Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 42, at 318 (statement of Irv Ackelsberg,
Managing Attorney, Community Legal Services), 312 (statement of John A. Courson, Vice President,
Mortgage Bankers Association); Mortgage Lending Practices: Hearing Before the House Banking and
Financial Services Comm., 106th Cong. 12 (2000) [hereinafter called Hearing on Mortgage Lending
Practices](statement of Gary Gensler, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Department of Treasury).
56. See GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 3; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 2,
21; Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 42, 323-24 (statement of Irv Ackelsberg,
Managing Attorney, Community Legal Services), 312 (statement of John A. Courson, Vice President,
Mortgage Bankers Association), 295 (statement of Judith A. Kennedy, President, National Association
of Affordable Housing Lenders); Hearing on Mortgage Lending Practices, supra note 55, at 12
(statement of Gary Gensler, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Department of Treasury).
57. See GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 3; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 2,
22; Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 3 (statement of Stella Adams, Board Member,
National Community Reinvestment Coalition).
58. See GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 3; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 2,
22; Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 42, 233 (statement of Jeffrey Zeltzer,
Executive Director, National Home Equity Mortgage Association), 296 (statement of Esther Canja,
President, American Association of Retired Persons), 312 (statement of John A. Courson, Vice
President, Mortgage Bankers Association); Hearing on Mortgage Lending Practices,supra note 55, at
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low interest rate, purchase-money loans as part of the new, higher
interest rate, home equity loan. 59 When a borrower has difficulty
making payments on the predatory loan, the lender may encourage
refinancing of the debt with a larger loan carrying a higher interest rate
and requiring higher monthly payments and payment of additional
points and closing costs. 60 Borrowers rarely obtain any benefit from a
loan flip other than postponing a foreclosure and often end up owing
more after having paid additional points and fees to the same or another
predatory lender. Predatory loans may also have other unfair terms such
as high prepayment fees, balloon payments, exorbitant late charges, and
single premium credit insurance. 6'
Fraudulent practices include
falsifying loan applications, forging borrowers' signatures, changing
loan terms at closing, misrepresenting loan terms, physically obscuring
key terms, and having borrowers sign documents with key terms left
blank.62 In some cases, lenders make the loans without regard to the
borrowers' ability to repay, relying instead on the borrower's equity in
the home to secure the loan 63-an underwriting practice that is not
appropriate for home mortgage lending.
The targets of predatory lenders are most often minorities, the elderly,

12 (statement of Gary Gensler, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Department of Treasury).
59. See Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 42, 318 (statement of Irv
Ackelsberg, Managing Attorney, Community Legal Services); 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending,
supra note 54, at 447 (letter from Elizabeth Renuart, Managing Attorney, St. Ambrose Legal Services,
to Sen. Donald W. Riegle Jr. (Feb. 17, 1993)). For example, John Thomas, a disabled African American
man, was required to refinance his 10.5% first mortgage at an interest rate of 11.99% in order to get a
second lien loan at an interest rate of 23.9%. See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, 2-3
(statement of Martina Guilfoil, Executive Director, Inglewood Neighborhood Housing).
60. See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 21.
61. See Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 42, at 398 (statement of Mike
Shea, Executive Director, ACORN Housing Corp.), 347 (statement of David Berenbaum, National
Community Reinvestment Coalition).
62. See Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 42, at 347 (statement of David
Berenbaum, National Community Reinvestment Coalition); 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending,
supra note 54, at 309 (statement of Scott Harshbarger, Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of Massachusetts).
63. See Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 42, at 318 (statement of lrv
Ackelsberg, Managing Attorney, Community Legal Services), 346 (statement of David Berenbaum,
National Community Reinvestment Coalition). In fact, cases have been documented in which monthly
payments on a home equity loan exceeded the borrower's monthly income. See, e.g., 1993 Hearings on
Problems in Lending, supra note 54, at 260 (statement of Terry Drent, Ann Arbor Community
Development Department) (discussing monthly payments of $250 required of a borrower with a
monthly income of $220), 292 (statement of Eva Davis, Resident, San Francisco) (discussing
approximate monthly payments of $2,000 required of a borrower with a monthly income of under
$1,100); Gary Chafetz & Peter S. Canellos, Elderly Poor Losing Homes in Loan Scam: Unregulated
Lenders Offer High Rates, Risks, BOSTON GLOBE, May 6, 1991, at 1, 6 (discussing monthly payments of
$2,062 required of a borrower with a monthly income of about $800).
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and the inner-city and rural poor. 64 Borrowers from predatory lenders
usually have substantial equity in their homes because of rising real
estate values or the reduction of purchase-money debt, but are short on
cash because of their low or fixed incomes. 6 5 They may need money to
make home repairs or improvements, to pay for necessities such as
medical care, or to consolidate household debts. 66 The elderly are
particularly vulnerable because they typically have a great deal of equity
in homes that they have owned for many years and because they likely
operate on fixed incomes.6 7
Perpetrators of predatory lending abuses include lenders, mortgage
brokers, and home improvement contractors. 6 8 These lenders seek out
particularly vulnerable homeowners on whom to prey. 69 Upon finding a
likely prospect, a lender, broker, or contractor may use high pressure
tactics or fraud
to induce the homeowner to enter into an abusive loan
70
transaction.

Predatory lending can be tremendously profitable for perpetrators of
abuses. Mortgage brokers and lenders who originate loans collect large
up-front fees when the loan is made. When the homeowner pays on
time, the lender reaps an enormous profit based on the high interest

64. See Hearing on Mortgage Lending Practices, supra note 55, at 12 (statement of Gary
Gensler, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Department of Treasury), 20 (statement of Donna
Tanoue, Chairwoman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending,
supra note 54, at 254 (statement of Scott Harshbarger, Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of Massachusetts),
257 (statement of Kathleen Keest, National Consumer Law Center).
65. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., & URBAN AFFAIRS, THE COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT, CREDIT ENHANCEMENT, AND REGULATORY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1993, S. REP. NO.
103-169, at 22 (1993), reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881.
66. See id.; 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 54, at 449 (letter from William E.
Morris, Director of Litigation, Southern Arizona Legal Aid, Inc., to Sen. Donald W. Riegle Jr. (Feb. 18,
1993)).
67. See Hearingon PredatoryMortgage Lending, supra note 42, at 296-97 (statement of Esther
Canja, President, American Association of Retired Persons); HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra
note 31, at 72; ROBERT J. HOBBS ET AL., NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PROBLEMS WITH
HOME EQUITY SCAMS, SECOND MORTGAGES, AND HOME EQUITY LINES OF CREDIT 9 (Am. Ass'n of
Retired Persons 1989).
68. See Hearingon PredatoryMortgage Lending, supra note 42, at 444 (statement of Consumer
Bankers Association); Hearingon MortgageLending Practices,supra note 55, at 12 (statement of Gary
Gensler, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Department of Treasury).
69. See Hearing on PredatoryMortgage Lending, supra note 42, at 17-18 (statement of Leroy
Williams, private citizen). They may check foreclosure notices to find financially troubled homeowners
or may cruise certain neighborhoods looking for homes in need of repair. See Mike Hudson, Stealing
Home: How the Government and Big Banks Help Second-Mortgage Companies Prey on the Poor, 26
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1476, 1479 (1993),
70. See 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 54, at 309 (statement of Scott
Harshbarger, Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of Massachusetts).
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rates. If the homeowner cannot pay, the lender forecloses and takes any
equity in the house. 7' Even if the borrower prepays the loan by
refinancing, the lender profits if the loan has a prepayment penalty.7 2
The effects of predatory lending are devastating for the individuals
who are victims and for their neighborhoods. At best, the victims of
predatory lenders end up paying too much in fees and interest for their
loans. The worst case scenario is that they lose their homes to
foreclosure.
A dramatic increase in foreclosures in inner-city
neighborhoods has followed the increase in subprime lending in recent
years.7 3 For individuals and families, the loss of a home to foreclosure
is devastating, both financially and psychologically.74 Foreclosures
caused by predatory lending have a negative impact on neighborhoods
as well since the impact of foreclosures may be concentrated in lowincome areas.75 Vacant homes caused by foreclosures can cause a
decrease in property values and an increase in crime, thereby
destabilizing at-risk neighborhoods. 76 Therefore, predatory lending has
an impact beyond the homeowners who obtain predatory loans.
Problems caused by predatory lenders first caught the attention of
lawmakers more than a decade ago.77 However, predatory lending has
been difficult to regulate, in part because it is difficult to define. 78 Some
practices, such as fraud, are clearly illegal. Other predatory lending
practices have been perfectly legal, and some individual practices are
71. See Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 42, at 318 (statement of Irv

Ackelsberg, Managing Attorney, Community Legal Services).
72. See id at 346 (statement of David Berenbaum, National Community Reinvestment Coalition).
Prepayment penalties are much more common in subprime loans than prime loans.
73. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 24. For example, foreclosures of homes in

Baltimore grew from 1,900 in 1995 to more than 5,000 in 1999. Id.
74. Id; Forrester, supra note 32, at 385-86. Financial issues include loss of equity in the home
and, in some states, the possibility of a deficiency judgment. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Critiquingthe
ForeclosureProcess: An Economic Approach Based on the ParadigmaticNorms of Bankruptcy, 79 VA.

L. REv. 959, 966-67 (1993).

Psychological issues include mental illness, suicide, crime, family

problems, sadness, depression, sleep loss, and anger. See Mortgage Foreclosures: HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the H. Comm. on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., I st Sess. 276 (1983) (statement of John J. Sheehan,
Director of Legis., United Steelworkers of America); Marc Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home:
Psychological Costs of Relocation, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 359,

359-61 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966).
75. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 25.
76. Id. See also 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 54, at 254 (statement of

Scott Harshbarger, Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of Massachusetts) (Predatory lending practices targeting
low-income neighborhoods may result in "the social fabric of many inner-city urban neighborhoods
[being] tom apart and communities destablized.").
77. See generally 1993 Hearingson Problems in Lending, supra note 54.
78. See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 17.
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legitimate under certain circumstances. 79 As the frequency of predatory
lending has continued to increase, lawmakers have continued to grapple
with the problem.
II. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE TO PREDATORY LENDING
A. FederalResponse to PredatoryLending
1. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act and Regulation Z
In 1994, in response to problems stemming from predatory lending,
80
Congress enacted the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act.
HOEPA defines certain home mortgage loans as "high-cost" loans and,
with respect to high-cost loans, requires particular disclosures and
prohibits designated unfair terms. 8 1 The Act specifically excludes from
its application purchase-money mortgages, reverse mortgages, and home
equity lines of credit; 82 therefore, it applies to refinance loans and
second lien loans that are not lines of credit. HOEPA initially defined
high-cost home mortgage loans as those with an annual percentage rate
more than ten points above Treasury bill rates or with points and fees
exceeding the greater of eight percent of the loan amount or $400, but
the Act provided for adjustment by the Federal Reserve Board after two
years.8 3 HOEPA requires that lenders make the required disclosures to a
homeowner three days before the consummation of the loan and
prohibits the lender from changing the terms of the loan without making
new disclosures. 84 The Act prohibits prepayment penalties under certain
circumstances, 85 an increased interest rate on default, 86 balloon
87
payments to be made less than five years after the closing of the loan,
and negative amortization 88 in high-cost loans. In addition, HOEPA
prohibits lenders from engaging "in a pattern or practice" of making
79. For example, a prepayment penalty could be appropriate in a prime mortgage loan if a
borrower makes an informed decision to include this provision in order to obtain a lower interest rate.
80. Pub. L. No. 103-325, tit. 1,subtit. B, 108 Stat. 2160 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1648
(2000)).
81. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1615.
82. Id. § 1602(i), (w), (aa), (bb).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa). The Federal Reserve Board adjusted the trigger rate in 2002. See
infra notes 100-04.
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a), (b).
85. Id. § 1639(c).
86. Id. § 1639(d).
87. Id.§ 1639(e).
88. Id. § 1639(f).
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high-cost loans without regard to the borrower's ability to repay. 89
HOEPA provides for civil liability for non-compliance 90 and may be
enforced by state attorneys general. 9 1
HOEPA eliminates holder-in-due-course status for purchasers of
HOEPA-covered loans. 92 As a result, assignees of HOEPA loans are
subject to all claims and defenses that the homeowner could have
asserted against the original lender.93 HOEPA does, however, limit the
liability of assignees to the total amount of the debt paid and remaining
unpaid.94 In addition, HOEPA provides a safe harbor for assignees who
can demonstrate that "a reasonable person exercising ordinary due
diligence, could not determine ...that the mortgage was [a HOEPAcovered loan].'
Consumer advocates have criticized HOEPA as being ineffective in
part because it is not sufficiently inclusive. 96 First, very few subprime
loans exceed the interest rate threshold.9 7 In fact, lenders may keep
interest rates just below the HOEPA trigger in order to avoid the Act's
requirements. Second, the fee trigger excludes reasonable fees paid to
99
third parties9 8 as well as fees paid by someone other than the borrower.
As a result, the trigger does not include potentially abusive fees such as
single premium credit insurance or yield spread premiums paid to a
mortgage broker.
Finally, HOEPA does not apply to high-cost
purchase-money loans, reverse mortgages, or home equity lines of
credit.
In response to criticism, the Federal Reserve Board revised
regulations under HOEPA effective October 2002.l°°
The new
Regulation Z lowers the trigger for first lien loans to eight points above
Treasury bill rates and includes premiums for credit insurance paid at

89. Id. § 1639(h).
90. See id.§ 1640.
91. See id.§ 1640(e).
92. See id.§ 1641(d)(1); Bryant v. Mortgage Capital Resource Corp., 197 F. Supp. 2d 1357
(N.D. Ga. 2002). See infra Part 1II.D for a discussion of the holder-in-due-course doctrine.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1).
94. Id. § 1641(d)(2).
95. Id. § 1641(d)(1).
96. See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 85; Hearingon Legislative Solutions,
supra note 42, at 3 (statement of Stella Adams, Board Member, National Community Reinvestment
Coalition).
97. See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 85.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(4).
99. See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 85.

100. 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604 (2001).
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closing in the fee trigger. I° 1 In addition, the regulation prohibits a
creditor from refinancing a high-cost mortgage within twelve months 0of2
closing unless the refinancing is in the "borrower's best interest."' 10 3
This provision was intended to address the problem of loan flipping.
Despite the new
regulations, consumer advocates claim that HOEPA is
04
not effective. 1
2. FTC Enforcement Actions
The FTC has filed enforcement actions against lenders engaged 0in5
predatory lending activities under HOEPA and other federal statutes.'
Between 1998 and 2003, the FTC filed nineteen complaints and reached
settlements in most of those cases. 10 6 Most of the settlements required
compensation to consumers and an agreement by the lender to stop
certain practices. Two of the most notable settlements are the settlement
reached with Citigroup 0 7 and a $60 million settlement with First
Alliance Mortgage Company. 10 8 The FTC and other federal agencies
focus their efforts on "cases that will have the most impact, such as
those that may result in large settlements to consumers or that will have
some deterrent value by gaining national exposure."' 0 9 Therefore, the
FTC's enforcement actions have been against some of the largest and

101. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i) (2005).
102. Id.

§ 226.32(b)(1)(iv).

103. 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604-1, at 65,616.
104. See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 2-3 (statement of Stella Adams,
Board Member, National Community Reinvestment Coalition); Protecting Homeowners: Preventing
Abusive Lending While Preserving Access to Credit: Hearing Before the Subcomms. on Financial
Institutions and Consumer Credit and Housing and Community Opportunity of the H. Comm. on
FinancialServices, 108th Cong. 11 (2003), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/
110503ms.pdf [hereinafter Hearing on Protecting Homeowners] (testimony of Margot Saunders,

Managing Attorney, National Consumer Law Center) ("Unfortunately it is clear that HOEPA has not
stopped predatory lending. Indeed, the problem has only grown worse in the eight years since it has
become effective.").
105. Other federal statutes the FTC has used in enforcement actions include the Federal Trade

§§ 41-58 (2000), the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1665, the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2603, and the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692.
Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C.

106. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, FTC SUBPRIME LENDING CASES (since 1998) (2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/07/subprimelendingcases.htm; GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 37, App. 1.

The Department of Justice and the Department of Housing and Urban Development were involved in
some of the cases. Id. These cases involved violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15
U.S.C. § 1691, and the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631. Id.
107. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
108. See GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 37-38.

109. Id. at40.
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most egregious offenders.
B. States' Response to PredatoryLending
More than thirty states have adopted statutory or regulatory schemes
designed to address the predatory lending problem." O Many of the state
statutes are similar to HOEPA in that statutory restrictions are triggered
by loans with interest rates or fees in excess of set levels."' Some have
statutes with triggers that are lower than HOEPA's, 1 2 while others are
the same. 1 3 Some of the statutes have multiple triggers with more
stringent requirements for loans with higher levels of interest rates and
fees.11 4 Most of the statutes have additional restrictions or requirements
beyond HOEPA for loans that are covered. 1 5 Statutes in some states
have increased the regulation and licensing requirements of loan
originators and brokers."16
North Carolina was the first state to enact a comprehensive predatory
110. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 494.0079, 494.00791 (West Supp. 2005); GA. CODE ANN. §76A-1 to 7-6A-13 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.IE (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:10B-24 to 46:10B35 (West Supp. 2005); N.Y. BANKING § 6-1 (McKinney Supp. 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1349.25-1349.37 (LexisNexis 2002); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 456.501-456.524 (West Supp.
2005). See also Butera & Andrews, 2005 Detailed Status Summary Chart ofState and Local Predatory
Lending Legislation (2006), http://www.butera-andrews.com/legislative-updates/directory/State/Legislature/
Bills/sbc/State Bill Chart 2005.pdf
In addition, some local governments have adopted ordinances prohibiting predatory lending
practices. See, e.g., OAKLAND, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 5.33 (2001); L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch.
16 (2003); Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance 372-02 (Mar. 4, 2002); Dayton, Ohio, Ordinance 29990-01 (July
11, 2001); N.Y., N.Y., LOCAL LAW 36 § 6-128 (2002); Summit County, Ohio, Ordinance 2004-386,
2004-618 (Aug. 16, 2004). However, some of these ordinances have been held to be preempted by state
law. See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813 (Cal. 2005) (holding that the Oakland
ordinance is preempted by California's predatory lending statute); City of Dayton v. State, 813 N.E.2d
707 (Ohio 2004) (holding that the Dayton ordinance by Ohio's predatory lending statute); Stephen F.J.
Ornstein et al., Local Anti-Predatory Lending Litigation Update, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 153
(2005). Other ordinances are subject to ongoing litigation to determine whether they are preempted by
state law. Id. at 156.
111. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 494.0079, 494.00791; GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(17); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:1OB-24; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.25(D); 63 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 456.503. See also GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 58.

112. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(17); N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 24-1.1E(6)(b);

N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 46:1OB-24.
113. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.25(D); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 343.201 (Vernon
2001).
114. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46: 1OB-24. See also Baher Azmy & David Reiss, Modeling a
Response to Predatory Lending: The New Jersey Home Ownership Security Act of 2002, 35 RUTGERS
L.J. 645, 674-76 (2004) (discussing the New Jersey Statute).
115. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(17); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(6)(b); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:1OB-26.
116. See GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 62.
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lending statute in 1999.' 7 Like HOEPA, the North Carolina statute
defines "high-cost" loans, but the trigger is set lower than HOEPA for
points and fees." 8 For these high-cost loans, the statute prohibits
balloon payments,' 19 negative amortization, 20 higher interest rates upon
default,' 2 ' call provisions giving a lender discretion to accelerate the
loan, 22 financing of any points or fees or charges payable to a third
party (which includes yield spread premiums), 123 and making a loan
without regard to the borrower's ability to repay. 124 In addition, the
statute prohibits financing insurance premiums and "flipping" for all
consumer home loans.12 5 Therefore, the statute goes beyond HOEPA in
offering protection to North Carolina homeowners because it covers
more loans and imposes more stringent restrictions.
26
Consumer advocates cite the North Carolina statute as a success,
and a number of states have followed North Carolina's lead in adopting
27
statutes with lower triggers and more prohibitions than HOEPA.1
Despite the additional protection provided by the North Carolina law to
subprime borrowers, the subprime market has grown in North Carolina
at a rate similar to states without such a statute.' 28 Every significant
subprime lender that made loans before the statute became effective in
1999 continued to do business in North Carolina after the statute was
effective. 129 North Carolina had fifteen percent more than the national

117. Act to Prohibit Predatory Lending, 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 332 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 24- 1.1A - 10.2 (2003)).
118. The trigger for points and fees is five percent of the loan amount, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 241.1E(a)(6)(b), rather than eight percent of the loan amount set by HOEPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(l)(B)(i)
(2000). The trigger for APR is the same as HOEPA's at eight percentage points above Treasury bill
rates. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1 E(a)(2).
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(b)(2).
120. Id. § 24-1.1E(b)(3).
121. Id. § 24-1.1E(b)(4).
122. Id. § 24-1.1E(b)(l).
123. Id. § 24-1.1E(c)(3).
124. Id. § 24-1.1E(c)(2).
125. Id. § 24-1.1E(c)(4).
126. See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 2 (statement of Martin Eakes, Chief
Executive Officer, Self-Help and the Center for Responsible Lending).
127. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-9-4-1 to 24-9-4-12 (West Supp. 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 46:1OB-24, 26 (West Supp. 2005); N.Y. BANKING § 6-1 (McKinney Supp. 2005).
128. See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 2 (statement of Martin Eakes, Chief
Executive Officer, Self-Help and the Center for Responsible Lending).
129. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, CRL POLICY BRIEF NO. 10, SUPPORT H.R. 1182 THE

PROHIBIT PREDATORY LENDING
MillerWattFrank-0305.pdf.

AcT

(2005),

http://www.responsiblelending.org/pkfs/pb0l0-
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average of subprime loans per capita in 2000.130
On the other hand, the Georgia Fair Lending Act (GFLA)' 3' initially
caused concern until it was quickly amended by the Georgia
legislature.' 32 The statute, in its original form, was the strongest in the
nation. It created three categories of loans: "home loans," "covered
home loans," and "high-cost home loans."'133 While the "home loan"
category included most home mortgage loans, 134 the other two
categories were defined based on a loan's annual percentage rate or on
points and fees charged. 135 The GFLA created a different set of
restrictions for each of the three categories. Some restrictions, including
limits on late fees and a prohibition on financing credit life insurance,
applied to all home loans.136 A restriction on flipping applied to covered
home loans. 137 Most of the restrictions, including limits on prepayment
fees, a prohibition on negative amortization, and credit counseling
requirements, applied only to high-cost home loans.1 38
Finally,
purchasers of high-cost home loans were made "subject to all
affirmative claims and any defenses with respect to the loan that the
borrower could assert against the original creditor .... ,, 13 9
After the Georgia legislature enacted the GFLA, rating agencies
responded by refusing to rate mortgage-backed securities secured by
pools of residential loans containing any loans originated in Georgia
after the effective date of the statute. 140 One of the primary concerns of
the rating agencies and lenders was that assignees would have unlimited
liability for claims that the borrower could assert against the originator.
In response, the Georgia legislature amended the assignee liability
provision of the GFLA to add a safe harbor for lenders who exercise

130. Id.
131. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A (2004).
132. S.B. 53, 147th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2003).
133. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(6), (8), (9), (19) (Supp. 2002) (amended 2003).
134. Id. § 7-6A-2(9).
135. Id. § 7-6A-2(6), (8), (19).
136. See id. § 7-6A-3.
137. See id. § 7-6A-4.
138. See id. § 7-6A-5.
139. Id. § 7-6A-6.
140. See Press Release, Fitch, Inc., FitchRatings Declines to Rate Georgia Loans in RMBS Pools,
Considers Impact to Other Predatory Lending Legislation (Feb. 5, 2003), available at
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/industry/news/03/02056.html;
Press Release, Moody's Investors
Service, Inc., Moody's Expands Consideration of Assignee Liability for Residential Mortgages in
Securitizations (Jan. 30, 2003), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/industry/new/03/
0130a.pdf; Press Release, Standard and Poor's, Standard and Poor's to Disallow Georgia Fair Lending
Act Loans (Jan. 16, 2003), availableat http://www.mortgagebankers.org/industry/news/03/0l 16b.html.
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reasonable due diligence to avoid purchasing high-cost home loans and
to limit the liability of those lenders who do not fit within the safe
harbor. 14 1 The rating agencies subsequently
announced that they would
42
again rate pools with Georgia loans.1
Likewise, other states have enacted statutes with assignee liability
provisions similar to the one in the amended Georgia statute. 143 These
states also include a safe harbor for lenders who exercise reasonable due
diligence to avoid purchasing high-cost home loans.' 44
Not surprisingly, lender and mortgage broker advocates have been
critical of state predatory lending laws. 145 They claim that state
regulations are too burdensome on honest subprime lenders, 146 that
compliance with the patchwork of state laws is too costly, 147 and that
state laws will have a negative effect on the availability of subprime
credit. 148 Lender groups have fought state laws at the state level and
have at the federal level proposed that federal law should preempt state
laws. Consumer groups, on the other hand, applaud the efforts of state
legislatures to combat predatory lending abuses.
III.

CAUSES OF PREDATORY LENDING

To solve the problem of predatory lending, it is necessary to ascertain
149
its causes, which have been examined by a number of commentators.
141. See GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-6 (2003). The legislature also amended the GFLA to eliminate
the "covered home loan" category altogether. See id. § 7-6A-2.
142. See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 114, at 712.
143. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-105(a) (Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24
(West Supp. 2005).
144. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-105(a); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24.
145. See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon,
Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond
Market Association), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage
Brokers).
146. See id. at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable
Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond Market Association), 4 (statement of Jim
Nabors, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage Brokers).
147. See id. at 4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable
Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond Market Association), 4 (statement of Jim
Nabors, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage Brokers).
148. See id. at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable
Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond Market Association), 4 (statement of Jim
Nabors, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage Brokers).
149. See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the
Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV 503, 507 (2002); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia
A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV.
1255, 1257-58 (2002); Forrester, supra note 32, at 419; Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime

2006]

MORTGAGING THE AMERICAN DREAM

1323

Certainly multiple factors have contributed to the proliferation of
mortgage lending abuse, including those resulting from changes in the
mortgage market occurring over the past twenty to thirty years.
A. Changes in the Mortgage Market
Before the mid-1970s, most prime mortgage loans were made by
depository institutions using deposits to fund the loans. 150 Home
mortgage loans were made primarily by savings and loan associations
(also called thrifts) to local borrowers using savings deposits of local
depositors. 151 The thrift would handle all aspects of the transaction
including the origination of the loan, 1 52 the funding of the loan from its
own capital in the form of deposits, and the servicing of the loan
throughout its life. 53 The thrift would hold the loan until it was paid off
or until a default resulted in foreclosure. Thus, the thrift had a long-term
relationship with the borrower.
The subprime mortgage market was dominated by finance companies
that originated loans using funds obtained through commercial paper,
15 4
bonds, bank lines of credit, and both long-term and short-term debt.
The finance companies held the loans they originated in portfolio 155 or
used the loans to secure their own debts. The finance company that

made a loan thus performed the origination, servicing, and ownership
"'HEL" Was Paved with Good CongressionalIntentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home
Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473 (2000).
150. In the late 1970s, savings and loans made half to as much as sixty percent of home mortgage
loans. See Mansfield, supranote 149, at 498 n.155 (citing 125 CoNG. REc. 29,930 (1979) (statement of
Sen. Morgan) (stating that savings and loans made about sixty percent of all home mortgage loans up to
1979) and David F. Seiders, Recent Developments in Mortgage and Housing Markets, 65 FED. RES.
BULL. 173, 180 (1979) (finding that in 1978 savings and loans made half of all home mortgage loans)).
151. See, e.g., IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films, Inc. 1946). When depositors threaten a
"run on the bank," Jimmy Stewart, as George Bailey, says:
You're thinkin' of this place all wrong as if I had the money back in a safe. The money's
not here. Why, your money's in Joe's house, that's right next to yours, and in the
Kennedy house and Mrs. Maplin's house and a hundred others. You're lending them the
money to build, and then they're going to pay it back to you as best they can.
Id.
152. Origination includes taking a loan application, checking the credit and employment of the
borrower, obtaining an appraisal of the property, and seeing that loan documents are prepared and
executed. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT 892 (6th ed. 2003).
153. Servicing includes collecting payments, holding tax and insurance escrow accounts, paying
taxes and insurance premiums from escrow accounts, and handling defaults. Id. at 479.
154. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 40.
155. Id.
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functions associated with the loans they made. 156 In the past, subprime
loans made up a very small portion of the home
mortgage market,'5 7 and
158
most subprime loans were second lien loans.
Today, both the prime and subprime mortgage markets operate
differently with the functions of origination, servicing, and ownership
generally being performed by different parties. Capital markets are the
source of most mortgage loan funds. Fewer loans are originated by
depository institutions, and more are originated by mortgage and finance
companies or through mortgage brokers. 159 Mortgage companies are in
the business of originating mortgage loans for sale to investors or to be
securitized. Mortgage companies do not require a large amount of
capital available for investment, since they typically hold mortgages
only until a sufficient number of mortgages can be pooled and sold to an
investor or securitized.160 The mortgage company often borrows money
to fund the accumulation of loans through a warehouse line of credit,
which the company draws down as loans are made and repays when a
package of loans is sold or securitized. 16 1 Sometimes the mortgage
company or other originator retains the servicing function, but usually
the loans are sold with servicing released, meaning
that a company other
162
than the originating lender services the loan.
Often the initial contact with a borrower is not even made by the loan
originator but by a mortgage broker. According to the National
Association of Mortgage Brokers, mortgage brokers may be involved in
more than half of all home mortgage loan originations. 63 Brokers are

156. Home improvement contractors were often involved in the origination of home improvement
loans made by finance companies. Sometimes the contractor originated loans and sold them to a finance
company, and sometimes the contractor referred loans to the finance company. Abuses in home
improvement loans led to the adoption of the FTC's Holder in Due Course Rule in 1976. See Julia P.
Forrester, Constructing a New Theoretical Framework for Home Improvement Financing, 75 OR. L.
REV. 1095, 1105-06 (1996).
157. See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 3 1, at 29. In 1983, subprime loans made up

only 1.4% of the home mortgage market. See Fred Faust, Acorn Blasts Number of Subpar Loans Being
Made in St. Louis Area: One Homebuyer Says She Is Stuck with a 30-year Mortgage at a 12 Percent

Rate, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 22, 1999, at C8. Even in 1994, subprime originations accounted
for less than five percent of all mortgage originations. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 3 1,
at 29.
158. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 30.

159. See Mansfield, supra note 149, at 526; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 39.
160. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.

161. See infra notes 372-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of warehouse lines of credit.
162. See Michael G. Jacobides, Mortgage Banking Unbundling: Structure, Automation and Profit,

61 MORTGAGE BANKING 28 (Jan. 1, 2001), availableat 2001 WLNR 4301659.
163. See Hearing on Mortgage Lending Practices, supra note 55, at 683 (statement of the
National Home Equity Mortgage Association); HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 3 1, at 39.
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paid a fee by the borrower or the lender and in some cases perform many
of the origination functions other than underwriting and the initial
funding. Brokers also may be paid a yield spread premium if the broker
at a rate above the rate offered by the
can induce the borrower to borrow
64
lender for a particular loan. 1
Today some investors purchase loan pools on a "whole loan" basis,
meaning that the investor buys the loans with the intent to hold them
directly, but more frequently the loans are packaged and securitized with
investors buying securities backed by the pool of loans. Securitization
of home mortgage loans began in the prime mortgage market when
Ginnie Mae created the first mortgage pass-through in 1970 by
guaranteeing securities backed by mortgage loans. 165 Freddie Mac
followed with a pass-through mortgage backed security (MBS) backed
by conventional loans in 1971,166 and in 1983 Freddie Mac issued the
first Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO), which created multiple
classes of bonds all backed by the same mortgage collateral but with
each class paid sequentially as principal payments were received from
the mortgage collateral. 167 Although mortgage collateral was seen as
being of high credit quality, particularly mortgages guaranteed by
government agencies, mortgage-backed securities suffered from the
uncertainty associated with mortgage prepayment. CMOs substantially
addressed that prepayment risk by creating sequential pay bonds that
to predict and price for the expected maturity of
better allowed investors
68
their investments. 1

See also WEICHER, supra note 48, at 32 (stating that brokers originated thirty-six percent of subprime
mortgage loans in 1996).
164. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 40.
165. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET

SECURITIZATION § 1:2 (Adam Ford ed., 2002). Ginnie Mae is a government agency in the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development. See infra note 402 and accompanying text.
166. See Anthony J. Colletta & Joseph C. Shenker, Asset Securitization:Evolution, CurrentIssues
andNew Frontiers,69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1384-85 (1991). "In a mortgage pass-through security, the
investor purchases a fractional undivided interest in a pool of mortgage loans, and is entitled to share in
the interest income and principal payments generated by the underlying mortgages.... Income from the
mortgage pool passes through to the investors." SCHWARCZ, supra note 165, § 1:2.
167. See Leland C. Brendsel, Securitization's Role in Housing Finance, in A PRIMER ON
SECURITIZATION 17, 22 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman, eds., 1996); Lewis S. Ranieri, The
Origins of Securitization, Sources of its Growth, and its Future Potential, in A PRIMER ON
SECURITIZATION, supra, at 31, 36-37. "The CMO concept is very simple. Rather than look at a
mortgage pool as a single group of thirty-year mortgages, the CMO concept approaches it as a series of
unique cash flows each year for the next thirty years. It recognizes that cash flows are higher in the
early years of the pool, and they can be carved up into separate tranches." Ranieri, supra,at 36.
168. See Frank S. Alexander, Mortgage Prepayment: The Trial of Common Sense, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 288, 332 (1987).
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The private sector first became significantly involved in securitization
in the late 1970s after rating agencies began rating mortgage-backed
securities not expressly or impliedly backed by the federal
government. 69 By the 1980s a significant portion of mortgage loans
were securitized. Securitization did not take hold in the subprime
mortgage market until the 1990s, but is now a major factor in the
70
subprime mortgage market.
A private lender that wants to securitize a pool of mortgage loans will
typically create a special purpose corporation, trust, or other entity,
called a special purpose vehicle (SPV).' 71 The SPV is created to be
"bankruptcy remote" from the originator or seller of the loans so that
creditors of the originator or seller will not have claims against the
SPV. 172
The originator or other owner of the loan pool sells the
mortgage loans to the SPV through a "true sale," which is an armslength sale with limited recourse back to the seller. 173 The SPV issues
1 74
the securities to raise cash to purchase the loan pool from the lender.
Investors in the securities need only be concerned with the cash flowing
from the mortgage loans and not with the originating lender's financial
condition. 175 In addition, the securities issued by the SPV represent a
fractional interest in a large pool of mortgage loans; therefore, the credit
risk to the investors is determined, not by the risk of default on any one
mortgage loan, but by the probability of a given number of loans within
the pool defaulting.
Credit risk analysis is now based on
macroeconomic factors or an actuarial analysis of the likelihood of
aggregate defaults exceeding a given prediction of expected
performance. 176 The securities are typically rated by one or more of the
rating agencies 177 based on third-party credit enhancement such as a

169. Eggert, supra note 149, at 537; Comm. on Bankr. & Corporate Reorganization of the Ass'n
of the Bar of the City of New York, StructuredFinancingTechniques, 50 Bus. LAW. 527, 537 (1995).
170. In 1994, thirty-two percent of subprime loans were securitized. By 1998, the rate was fiftyfive percent before it dropped back to thirty-seven percent in 1999. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT,
supra note 31, at 41. See also Glenn B. Canner et al., Recent Developments in Home Equity Lending, 84
FED. RES. BULL. 241, 249 (1998) ("Most subprime lenders place heavy reliance on securitization of their
loans to fund their operations.").
171. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133,
134 (1994).
172. See id at 135-36; SCHWARCZ, supra note 165, § 1:1, at 4.
173. See Schwarcz, supra note 171, at 142-43.
174. SCHWARCZ, supra note 165, § 1: 1.
175. Schwarcz, supranote 171, at 136.
176. See id. at 135. See also Stephen J. Lubben, Beyond True Sales: Securitization and Chapter
11, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 89, 104 (2004) (listing factors considered in determining credit risk).
177. Schwarcz, supra note 171, at 136. The most well-known rating agencies are Standard &
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guaranty, surety bond, or bank letter of credit 78 or credit enhancement
securities to investors willing
provided by the issuance of subordinated
79
to accept additional repayment risks. 1
With credit enhancements, securities backed by subprime loans can
achieve investment grade status. 180 More importantly, investors are able
to purchase securities backed by a highly diversified pool of mortgages
with the price of such securities based on an actuarial prediction of
aggregate defaults. Securities backed by mortgage pools comprised of

subprime loans may have a higher investor yield, but the higher cost of
funding is more than made up for by the higher yield on the mortgage
assets because they have higher interest rates than prime loans.

The

higher investor yield has attracted a greater amount of investor money.
As a result, securitization has been instrumental in funneling substantial
additional funds into the subprime mortgage market.
B. PartiesInvolved in Origination
Changes in the operation of the mortgage market have contributed to
the proliferation of abusive mortgage lending practices. One of the

changes exacerbating the problem is the type of parties involved in the
mortgage origination process. Today, loans are originated by mortgage
companies and mortgage brokers whose sole purpose is the origination
function.181 Mortgage companies may fund a mortgage loan initially
with borrowed funds, but will sell the loan as soon as the company has

accumulated enough loans for a pool. Therefore, a mortgage company
does not have to be highly capitalized. 182 Mortgage brokers require even
Poor's Rating Group (&P), Moody's Investors Service, Inc. (Moody's) and Fitch, Inc. (Fitch). See
SCHWARCZ,supra note 165, § 1:2 n.13.
178. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 165, § 2:3.
179. Id. §2:4; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 42. Senior securities have less
risk and a lower interest rate, while subordinate securities have greater risk and a higher interest rate.
See Schwarcz, supranote 171, at 143.
180. See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 42.
181. See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text. Subprime lenders rely more on brokers and
"correspondents"-lenders who make loans using funds borrowed through a warehouse line of creditthan do prime lenders. See WEICHER, supra note 48, at 32-33. In 1996, forty-seven percent of
subprime loans were originated by correspondents and thirty-six percent by brokers. Id. at 32. In the
prime market in the same year, correspondents accounted for thirty-five percent of originations and
brokers for twenty-two percent. Id.
182. See Brendsel, supra note 167, at 24 ("Although it is a stretch to suggest that anyone with a
modem and a fax machine can be a lender today, relatively little capital is required to start a mortgage
banking operation in the 1990s, and even less to become a mortgage broker."), quoted in Eggert, supra
note 149, at 556. Yesterday's lenders had to be more highly capitalized because they generally retained
ownership of the loans they originated for the life of the loans.
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less capital since they typically do not fund loans, but rather make a fee
for putting borrower and lender together, taking the borrower's loan
application, checking the borrower's credit, and otherwise participating
in the origination process.' 83 As a result, when a borrower has a claim
against a mortgage company or broker for predatory lending practices,
the culpable party may be judgment proof.
Also contributing to the predatory lending problem is the lack of
regulation of parties involved in the origination process. The HUDTreasury National Predatory Lending Task Force identified mortgage
brokers and home improvement contractors, both intermediaries in the
origination of mortgage loans, as being significantly involved in
predatory lending practices.184 Both are significantly less regulated than
the depository institutions that originated many mortgage loans in the
past. Home improvement contractors are subject to regulation under the
law of some states, but not under federal law. 185 Regulation of mortgage
brokers is primarily state law and is modest compared to regulation of
186
the other types of institutions involved in home mortgage lending.
The lack of regulation makes it easier to get into the mortgage brokering
business, easier to perpetrate abusive practices, and easier to close up
shop before victims of abuse can be compensated.
The low capitalization necessary for mortgage bankers and mortgage
brokers, as well as their lack of regulation, has led to the proliferation of
mortgage lending abuses by fly-by-night operators. Mortgage bankers
and brokers can originate loans using predatory practices, then shut
down and move to another state. When originators sell loans on the
secondary market shortly after origination, the new lender is left to deal
with any defenses to payment or may be immune under the holder-indue-course doctrine. 187 When intermediaries like home improvement
contractors and mortgage brokers are involved in originating a loan, they
may be more concerned with generating fees than with the loan's
ultimate repayment. 1 88 But when the homeowner seeks a remedy, the
intermediary may be judgment proof, may have moved to another state,
or may be out of business. The homeowner may thus be left without a

183. Id; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 39.
184. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supranote 31, at 39.

185. Id.
186. Id. at 40. In response to the predatory lending problem, some states have recently adopted
more stringent regulation and licensing requirements for mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers,
including new bonding and educational requirements. See GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 62.
187. See infra Part III.D.
188. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supranote 31, at 40.
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remedy.
C. Separationof Investorsfrom the Problems
The new horizontal segmentation of the mortgage lending market is
also a factor in the increase in predatory lending. Because of the
separation of the mortgage lending functions, the party who deals
directly with the borrower in brokering or originating the loan may not
have any contact with the borrower after origination.
Although
originating lenders sometimes retain the servicing function, where a
broker is involved, the originating lender may not even have an office in
the same community or state as the borrower. The parties who broker,
originate, and service loans rarely own the loans they broker, originate,
and service.
Thus, investors in mortgage loans can separate themselves from any
abusive practices. They do not suffer harm to their reputations that
might come about by being involved in abusive practices. In addition,
as discussed below, purchasers of abusive loans are often protected by
the holder-in-due-course doctrine against many of a borrower's claims
or defenses that might arise from the abusive practices. 89 Purchasers of
securities backed by predatory loans are further separated from
involvement in the origination or terms of individual loans and are
further insulated from loss.1 90 Therefore, investors may provide the
funding for predatory loans while turning a blind eye to the abusive
practices involved in their origination.
D. Holder-in-Due-CourseDoctrine
One factor that insulates investors in predatory loans from liability is
the holder-in-due-course doctrine.
The holder' 9' of a negotiable
92
promissory note' becomes a holder in due course if the note is not

189. See Eggert, supra note 149, at 613; Forrester, supranote 32, at 422. See infra Part 11ID.
190. See infra Part III.E.

191. A holder is a person who obtains an instrument by negotiation. See U.C.C. § 3-201(a)
(2000). Negotiation requires transfer of possession and indorsement for an instrument payable to the
order of a particular party. Id. § 3-201(b).
192. A negotiable instrument is:
an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without
interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it:
(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of
a holder;
(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
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obviously forged, altered, irregular, or incomplete, and the holder takes
it for value, in good faith, and without notice of certain problems. 193 A
holder in due course holds a note free from personal defenses of the
maker and claims in recoupment of the maker against the original
payee. 194 Personal defenses avoided by a holder in due course include
fraud in the inducement, misrepresentation,
mistake, lack or failure of
95
consideration, and breach of warranty.'
The problems that give rise to personal defenses are exactly the types
of problems that often exist in predatory mortgage loans. Therefore, an
assignee who is a holder in due course can avoid these defenses to
payment and require the borrower to pay the note despite valid
defenses. 196 The borrower's only recourse then is to sue the originator
or broker who committed the fraud or engaged in other conduct giving
rise to a defense. However, these parties may no longer be in business
or may be judgment proof. 197 Thus, the borrower may have to continue
paying on the note to avoid foreclosure, but may have no meaningful
recourse against the culpable party-the broker or originator.
(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or
ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money ....
U.C.C. § 3-104(a).
193. A holder in due course is the holder of an instrument if:
(1) the instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear such apparent
evidence of forgery or alteration or is not otherwise so irregular or incomplete as to call
into question its authenticity; and
(2) the holder took the instrument (i) for value, (ii) in good faith, (iii) without notice that
the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored or that there is an uncured default with
respect to the payment of another instrument issued as part of the same series, (iv)
without notice that the instrument contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered,
(v) without notice of any claim to the instrument described in Section 3-306, and (vi)
without notice that any party has a defense or claim in recoupment described in Section
3-305(a).
U.C.C. § 3-302(a).
Good faith requires both "honesty in fact" and "the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing." U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4). In determining if a holder has observed reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing, the test is not whether the holder exercised care in the purchase of a note, but
considers rather the fairness of the holder's conduct. U.C.C. § 3-103 cmt. 4.
194. U.C.C. § 3-305.
195. U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 2.
196. See, e.g., Wilson v. Toussie, 260 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that current
lenders who acquired mortgage loans at closing or on the secondary market were holders in due course
and thus claims based on predatory lending practices of original lenders were dismissed against current
lenders); Stuckey v. Provident Bank, 912 So. 2d 859 (Miss. 2005) (holding that the assignee of home
mortgage loan, as a holder in due course, was immune from claims that the original lender had engaged
in predatory lending practices).
197. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
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The holder-in-due-course doctrine has a history of creating problems
for consumers. Prior to 1976, sellers of goods and services to consumers
could separate the consumer's obligation to pay from the seller's
obligation to perform by selling the consumer's note to a holder in due
course. 198 The transferee of the note, as a holder in due course free of
personal defenses, could insist on payment even if the goods or services
were not delivered or performed, or were defective. The FTC found that
sellers used this ability to transfer a note free from contract defenses as199a
means to effectuate unethical sales practices in consumer transactions.
In response to these abuses in consumer sales, the FTC promulgated a
trade regulation rule, the Holder in Due Course Rule, which eliminates
the holder-in-due-course doctrine for certain transactions.200 The rule
operates by requiring a notice in consumer credit contracts that makes
the holder of the contract subject to claims and defenses that the debtor
could assert against the seller. 20 1 Affirmative recovery by a consumer
against the holder of a consumer credit contract is limited to the amount
the consumer has already paid; 202 therefore, the holder's loss is limited
to the amount to be paid under the consumer credit contract. The FTC
Holder in Due Course Rule applies only to sales of goods or services for
personal, family, or household use.20 3 Therefore, it applies to home
improvement loans, but not to other home mortgage loans.
At the time the FTC rule was adopted, lenders predicted dire
consequences that did not materialize. 20 4 The FTC Holder in Due
Course Rule caused only a small reduction in the availability of
consumer credit.2 0 5 In 1988, the FTC reviewed the regulation to
determine the economic impact on small businesses and, in particular,

198. Guidelines on Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of Consumers' Claims and
Defenses, 41 Fed. Reg. 20,022, 20,022-23 (May 14, 1976); Forrester, supra note 156, at 1105.
199. Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses: Promulgation of Trade Regulation Rule
and Statement of Basis and Purpose, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, 53,509 (Nov. 18, 1975).
200. Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1-.3 (2005).
201. See id. § 433.2.
202. See id. § 433.2 (a), (b).
203. Id. § 433.1(b).
204. Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Codification and the Victory of Form over Intent in
Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 363, 429-30 (2002); William H. Lawrence & John
H. Minan, The Effect of Abrogating the Holder-in-Due-CourseDoctrine on the Commercializationof
Innovative Consumer Products,64 B.U. L.REV. 325, 338-39 & n.51 (1984).
205. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 503 (4th ed.
1995); Eggert, supra note 204, at 429; Lawrence & Minan, supra note 204, at 338-39 & n.51; Edward
L. Rubin, Learning from Lord Mansfield: Toward a Transferability Law for Modern Commercial
Practice,31 IDAHO L. REV. 775, 789 (1995).
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on the availability of credit.2 °6 The FTC, receiving few comments,
concluded that the rule had "not had a significant economic impact on
small businesses," and it retained the rule as written.20 7 Honest
merchants and lenders were able to adapt to the FTC rule, so only the
dishonest were greatly affected.20 8
HOEPA has a provision that operates in a manner similar to the FTC
Holder in Due Course Rule for home mortgage loans covered by
HOEPA.2 °9 Like the FTC rule, HOEPA limits the liability of the
assignee of a loan to the amount to be paid and remaining to be paid
under the loan.21 0 In addition, many state predatory lending statutes
provide for assignee liability to varying degrees. 2 1'
E. FurtherInsulation by Securitization
Investors in mortgaged-backed securities are protected against losses
caused by predatory lending practices of the originators of the loans in
the pool backing the securities. Investors hold securities representing an
interest in a pool of loans, not direct interests in individual loans.
Therefore, the risk of loss to the investor is determined by the
performance of the entire pool of loans rather than by any individual
loan. Several factors reduce the risk of loss to investors. First, the SPV
that holds the mortgage pool typically has some contractual recourse
against the originator or other seller of the loans and may require the
seller to repurchase loans that do not conform to certain standards.2 12
Second, when the holder in due course rule applies without limitations
created by HOEPA or state law, the only recourse that victims of
predatory lending have is to the mortgage broker or originator of the
loan.21 3 If the holder in due course doctrine does not apply or if HOEPA
or state law abrogates some of its protection, the victim may assert a
claim or defense against the current holder of the loan. If a pool of loans
has been securitized, however, an SPV is typically the holder of the

206. See
FED.
TRADE
COMM'N,
FTC
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/F93/holderrul2.htm.

ENDS

REVIEW

OF

"HOLDER"

RULE,

207. Id.
208. See Homer Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Credit-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM.
L. REV. 445, 473 (1968).
209. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 139, 141, and 143-44 and accompanying text.
212. See Eggert, supra note 149, at 548.
213. These parties may be judgment proof as discussed in subpart B above.
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loans.21 4 In most securitization transactions, the SPV is created for the
particular transaction and its only assets are the loans making up the
pool that is the subject of the securitization.2 15
If a borrower
successfully asserts a claim or a defense to payment of a particular loan
against the SPV, 2 16 the loss is spread among the holders of the securities.
Finally, the borrowers have no recourse against the holders of the
securities who are the ultimate investors in and funders of the loans.
Some investors in mortgage-backed securities have additional
protection based on credit enhancements. Investors in mortgage-backed
securities price their investments based on credit ratings from the rating
agencies and the investors' own perceptions of the likelihood of a given
number of defaults occurring in the pool of mortgages.2 1 7 The senior
investors are generally well protected by the SPV's issuance of
subordinated securities, which bear more of the risk of loss than the
holders of the senior securities.2 18 Additionally, the SPV may purchase
third-party credit enhancement such as third-party insurance, guarantees,
surety bonds, or letters of credit whereby "a creditworthy party ensures
payment of all or a portion of the securities issued by the SPV. ' ,2 19 In
the event that the SPV is subject to losses or liabilities as a result of
predatory lending practices of the originator, the subordinated securities
or third-party credit enhancement providers may suffer unexpected
losses, but it is unlikely that such liabilities will impact the senior
security holders. Because the subordinated securities bear most of the
risk of loss, senior investors in mortgage-backed securities are generally
isolated from losses caused by predatory lending practices of the
originator even beyond the protection that the holder in due course
doctrine and the securitization process give to investors.
F. IncreasedAvailability of Subprime Credit
Securitization of mortgage loans also contributes to the predatory
lending problem because of the greatly increased amount of capital now
available for investment in mortgage loans. When most home mortgage
214. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
215. See Schwarcz, supra note 171, at 138.

216. The borrower may be able to assert a defense because it is a real rather than a personal
defense, or because the SPV is subject to defenses under HOEPA or a state predatory lending statute.
217. See Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in American Finance, A PRIMER ON
SECURITIZATION, supra note 167, at 4.
218. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact of Bankruptcy Reform on "'TrueSale " Determination in
Securitization Transaction,7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 353, 364 (2002).
219. SCHWARCZ, supra note 165, § 2:3, at 16.
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loans were made by depository institutions, the limited available credit
went to prime borrowers. 220 The tremendous increase in the size of the
market for subprime loans is a result of securitization. Since the 1990s
when securitization of subprime loans proliferated, the volume of
subprime lending has increased drastically from $35 billion in 1994 to
$160 billion in 1999221 and $529 billion in 2004.222 In addition, as
securitization of subprime loans has become more common, prime
have become
lenders, Wall Street investment firms, and the GSEs
223
market.
subprime
the
in
players
additional
as
involved
With the increase in the size of the subprime market has come an
increase in predatory lending abuses.22 4 Notably, the increase in
subprime lending and the related increase in predatory lending occurred
after the enactment of HOEPA. The availability of legitimate subprime
loans to borrowers who do not qualify for prime loans should
theoretically reduce the amount of predatory lending because borrowers
should have more options. However, most victims of predatory lenders
do not shop around for the best deal. In fact, many homeowners with
predatory loans did not seek out credit but were approached by the
lender, a home improvement contractor, or a mortgage broker. These
homeowners may not understand the terms of their loans, may not
realize they could get credit on better terms, or may have been
fraudulently induced into the loan with promises of better terms than
they ultimately receive.22 5 As a result, predatory lending continues

220. Engel & McCoy, supra note 149, at 1272-73; Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit
Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 393, 406-07 (1981); John V.
Duca & Stuart S. Rosenthal, Do Mortgage Rates Vary Based on Household Default Characteristics?
Evidence on Rate Sorting and Credit Rationing, 8 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 99, 101-02 (1994).

Finance companies making subprime loans mostly made second lien loans for home improvement or
debt consolidation. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
221. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 2, 42. See also Hearing on Predatory
Mortgage Lending, supra note 42, at 398 (statement of Mike Shea, Executive Director, ACORN

Housing Corp.) (increasing 900% between 1993 and 1999), 345 (statement of David Berenbaum,
National Community Reinvestment Coalition) ("increased almost 1000 percent from 1993-1998").
222. Top 25 B&C Lenders in 2004, 2005 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, Vol. 1 (March

2005). Today more than thirteen percent of outstanding mortgage loans are subprime according to the
Mortgage Bankers Association. See States Shelter Risky Borrowers, supranote 29, at A4.
223. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 45-46. GSE involvement has been
primarily with subprime borrowers with A- credit ratings. Id. at 46.
224. See 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604 (Dec. 20, 2001) ("With this increase in subprime lending there has
also been an increase in reports of "predatory lending."). A consumer advocacy group estimated in 2001
that predatory lending cost affected borrowers to the extent of $9.1 billion annually. See ERIC STEIN,
COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY LENDING

3 (2001), http://responsiblelending.org/pdfs/QuantI 0-01 .pdf.
225. See Forrester, supra note 32, at 389-90.
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despite the availability of reputable subprime lending options. The
increased availability of funds created by securitization of subprime
loans has made more funds available to predatory lenders as well.
G. Market Failure
Professors Engel and McCoy make a compelling argument that
market failures have been a key factor in the proliferation of predatory
loans.2 26 They classify the mortgage market into three segments: the
prime market, the legitimate subprime market, and the predatory loan
market.22 7 Borrowers in the predatory loan market are disconnected
from the credit market "because of historical credit rationing,
discrimination, and other social and economic forces. 2 28
Some
borrowers in the predatory market could qualify for prime loans, but for
some reason do not have access to the prime market. 229 Others are
properly classified as subprime borrowers, but do not have access to the
legitimate subprime market. Finally, some simply cannot afford credit
and should not have access to any type of loan.2 3 °
People who are disconnected from the credit market are those who for
some reason cannot or do not shop for the best credit deal.2 3 1 They tend
to be borrowers who do not shop for credit at all because they may not
realize it is available. They are targeted by contractors, brokers, and
predatory lenders who take advantage of information asymmetries to
induce borrowers to take out a loan on disadvantageous terms because
they are not aware that better terms are available.2 32 Predatory lenders
have different marketing strategies from legitimate lenders who
advertise then wait for borrowers to approach them. Predatory lenders
shop for and approach the borrowers and thus reach borrowers who
would not otherwise apply for a loan.23 3 Therefore, the existence of
legitimate subprime lenders does not drive predatory lenders out of the
226. Engel & McCoy, supra note 149, at 1277-97. See also Forrester, supra note 32, at 419-21

(discussing market failure in home equity loan market).
227. Engel & McCoy, supranote 149, at 1278.

228. Id. at 1279.
229. Id.; Freddie Mac, Automated Underwriting: Making Mortgage Lending Simpler and Fairer
for America's Families Ch. 5 nn.5-6 (Sept. 1996) available at http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/
reports/Moseley/mosehome.ntm. One Freddie Mac study determined that between ten and thirty-five
percent of subprime borrowers qualified for a prime loan and a poll of subprime lenders found that half
of subprime mortgages could qualify as investment grade mortgagees. Id.
230. See Engel & McCoy, supranote 149, at 1279.

231. Id. at 1281.
232. See Forrester, supra note 32, at 389, 420.
233. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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market. Because the market cannot eliminate predatory lending,
government intervention is necessary.
H. FederalPreemption of State ConsumerProtectionLegislation
Another factor in the growth of predatory lending has been the federal
preemption of state consumer protection measures.234 In 1980, Congress
enacted the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act (DIDMCA),235 which preempts state usury ceilings on any
"federally related mortgage loan" secured by a first lien on residential
real estate.236 Because of DIDMCA's broad definition of "federally
related mortgage loan," the preemption applies to virtually any first lien
home mortgage made by an institutional lender.237 DIDMCA provides
that states could opt out of the usury preemption during a specified time
period, but only sixteen states did so. 2 3 8 Although DIDMCA is limited
in its application to first lien loans, lenders can require a borrower to
refinance existing liens in order to fit within the preemption. 239 Most
234. See Forrester, supra note 32, at 388, 419; Mansfield, supra note 149, at 476.
235. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. at 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
236. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a)(1) (2000). The reasons for Congress' preemption of state usury
laws were:
(i) to promote the stability and viability of financial institutions by allowing them to
charge and collect realistic market interest on mortgage loans, and (ii) to promote the
national housing policy and the American dream of homeownership by legislatively
opening a spigot which would insure an increased and evenly-spread flow of available
mortgage money.
Smith v. Fid. Consumer Disc. Co., 898 F.2d 907, 911 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Bank of N.Y. v. Hoyt, 617
F. Supp. 1304, 1311 (D.R.I. 1985)). Preemption of usury laws was necessary to the viability and
stability of the nation's financial institutions because DIDMCA also eliminated ceilings on interest rates
paid on savings and loan deposits. S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 255. Preemption of usury laws promoted homeownership because interest rates had
risen above usury ceilings in some states making mortgage funds unavailable in those states since
lenders could not make loans at market rates. Id. at 254-55.
237. See Forrester, supra note 32, at 399. A federally related mortgage loan is any loan that is
(1) made by a lender whose deposits or accounts are federally insured; (2) made by a federally regulated
lender; (3) made, insured, guaranteed, or otherwise assisted by HUD or any other federal agency; (4)
eligible for purchase by FNMA, GNMA, or FHLMC, or from any financial institution from which it
could be purchased by FHLMC; or (5) made by any creditor subject to the Truth in Lending Act who
makes or invests in residential real estate loans totaling more than $1 million per year. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1735f-5(b)(2). For purposes of the usury law preemption, the term is expanded to include loans made
by any lender approved by HUD for participation in a federal mortgage insurance program and loans
made by an individual providing financing for the sale of the individual's residence. See id. § 1735f7a(a)(1)(C)(vi).
238. See Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance: Preemption and
FederalCommon Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 293,315 (1993).
239. See Forrester, supra note 32, at 417-18.
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courts that have addressed the issue have held that the DIDMCA
preemption applies to non-purchase-money loans as long as the lender
has a first lien.24 0 The issue now appears to be settled.24 '
Because of DIDMCA, subprime lenders can legally charge whatever
rate of interest a particular borrower will pay by requiring a first lien on
the borrower's home. Because of the market failures discussed above,24 2
some borrowers will pay interest at a rate higher than the rate reflecting
the lender's risk of making the loan.24 3 One of the characteristics of a
predatory loan is an interest rate exceeding the amount necessary to
compensate the lender for the associated risk.24 4 Some borrowers who
could obtain prime loans are steered to the subprime market. Other
borrowers are subprime borrowers but pay more interest in the predatory
loan market than they would pay in the legitimate subprime market.24 5
DIDMCA is one of the causes of the predatory lending problem because
states could regulate the rates that lenders charge on first lien home
mortgage loans absent DIDMCA.
Another federal statute, the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity
Act (Parity Act) preempts state laws that restrict alternative mortgage
transactions,2 46 which include variable interest rate loans, loans with
balloon payments, and shared appreciation mortgages.24 7 The Parity Act
applies to any "loan or credit sale secured by an interest in residential
real property"; 248 therefore, it is not limited to purchase-money loans or

240. See Brown v. Investor Mortgage Co., 121 F.3d 472, 475 (9th Cir. 1997); Fid. Consumer
Disc. Co., 898 F.2d at 912; Gora v. Banc One Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 95 C 2542, 1995 WL 613131 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 17, 1995); L.G.H. Enters., Inc. v. Kadilac Mortgage Bankers, Ltd. (In re L.G.H. Enters., Inc.),
146 B.R. 612, 616 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). See also Hoyt, 617 F. Supp. at 1310 (finding that DIDMCA applies
to construction loans made to residential developers so long as other statutory requirements are met);
FirstSouth F.A. v. Lawson Square, Inc. (In re Lawson Square, Inc.), 61 B.R. 145, 150 (Bankr. W.D.
Ark. 1986) (finding that DIDMCA applies to loans made for the purpose of developing residential real
estate so long as the lender takes a first lien on the property). But see Fid. Fin. Servs. Inc. v. Hicks, 574
N.E.2d 15, 21 (111. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that DIDMCA applies only to purchase-money loans).
241. See Mansfield, supra note 149, at 520.
242. See supra Part III.G.
243. See Engels & McCoy, supra note 149, at 1279 (discussing subprime borrowers who would
qualify for a prime loan); see also Mansfield, supra note 149, at 542 ("[I]t does not appear that pricing is
closely tied to actual risk or any other objective factors."). As evidence, Professor Mansfield cites, inter
alia, the profitability of subprime lenders and their lack of uniformity in underwriting and pricing. Id. at
540-41.
244. See supranote 54 and accompanying text.
245. See supranotes 227-30 and accompanying text.
246.

12 U.S.C. § 3803(c) (2000).

247. Id. § 3802(1).
248. Id. Congress enacted the statute because "alternative mortgage transactions are essential to
the provision of an adequate supply of credit secured by residential property." Id. § 3801(a)(2).
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loans secured by a first lien.249 Various federal agencies have adopted
regulations permitting federally chartered financial institutions to
provide alternative mortgage financing, 2 50 and the Parity Act extended
preemption of state law in this area to apply to other residential
mortgage lenders.2 51 Under the Parity Act, these other lenders may
make alternative mortgage loans that comply with federal regulations
rather than state law.252 As with the federal preemption of state usury
law under DIDMCA, states were permitted to opt out of the
preemption,2 53 and several states did.25 4
Under the Parity Act, predatory lenders have been able to require
certain onerous terms in home mortgage loans because the Parity Act
preempts state regulation of those terms. For example, states may not
prohibit balloon payments in home mortgage loans because of the Parity
Act.255 Therefore, a predatory loan may be amortized over thirty years,
but with a large balloon payment due after only three years. When a
balloon payment becomes due, the borrower must find the funds to pay
off the loan or refinance, which means additional fees and closing costs.
Until recently, predatory lenders could also impose large prepayment
penalties and onerous late charges without regard to state regulation
because of the Parity Act. 256 Balloon payments, large prepayment
penalties, and onerous late charges are all common features of a
predatory loan.2 57
In 2003, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) removed both
prepayment rules and late fee rules from the list of its regulations that
preempt state law under the Parity Act. 258 The OTS had determined that
249. See Forrester, supra note 32, at 419.
250. 12 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(3).
251. Id. § 3803(c).
252. Id. § 3801(b), 3803(a). Congress gave authority to the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (for banks), the National Credit Union Administration (for credit unions), and the Office of
Thrift Supervision (for other housing creditors) to "identify, describe, and publish those portions or
provisions of their respective regulations that are inappropriate for (and thus inapplicable to) or that need
to be conformed for the use of, nonfederally chartered housing creditors ....
Pub. L. No. 97-320,
§ 807(b), reprintedin 12 U.S.C. § 3801 note.
253. 12 U.S.C. § 3804.
254. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 1-110 (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. BANKING LAW
§ 6-g (McKinney 1990).
255. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3802(1)(B), 3803.
256. 12 C.F.R. §§ 560.33, 560.34 (2005) (amended). Prepayment penalties are much more
common in subprime loans than in prime loans.
257. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. DIDMCA and the Parity Act allow high interest
rates and unfair loan terms that might otherwise be prohibited by state law. Bankruptcy law prevents the
loan terms from being changed. See Forrester, supra note 32, at 427-35.
258. 67 Fed. Reg. 60,542 (Sept. 26, 2002).
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"the application of its late fee and prepayment penalty regulations to
housing creditors might be contributing to predatory lending practices in
the subprime mortgage market., 2 59 The change was backed by state
attorneys general as a means to combat predatory lending.260
In
response to a challenge by the National Home Equity Mortgage
Association, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
upheld the right of the OTS to determine the types of loan terms covered
by the Parity Act. 26 1 Therefore, states may now regulate prepayment
premiums and late fees for non-federally chartered lenders. For federal
banks and thrifts, however, state consumer protection measures aimed at
combating the predatory lending problem are preempted.
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE PREDATORY LENDING LAWS
A. Recent Regulatory Developments
In 1996, pursuant to the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA),26 2 the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) issued regulations that preempt state
laws "affecting the operations of federal savings associations ...to
enable federal savings associations to conduct their operations in
accordance with the best practices of thrift institutions. 2 63
The
regulation specifically provides that it "occupies the entire field of
lending regulation for federal savings associations." 2 6
More
specifically, the regulation preempts state laws that impose requirements
regarding licensing, credit terms, loan fees, disclosure requirements,
origination, and interest rate ceilings.2 65 Recently, the OTS has issued
letters announcing preemption of predatory lending statutes in
Georgia, 266 New York, 267 New Jersey, 2 68 and New Mexico. 269 In

259. Nat'l Home Equity Mortgage Ass'n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 373 F.3d 1355, 1357
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing 65 Fed. Reg. 17,811, 17,813 (Apr. 5, 2000)).
260. Id.at 1361-62.
261. Id.at 1356.
262. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468c (2000).
263. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2005).
264. Id.
265. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b). The regulation provides that it does not preempt state laws that "only
incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal savings associations" such as contract and
commercial law, real property law, tort law and criminal law. Id.§ 560.2(c).
266. Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-2003-1, Preemption of Georgia
Fair Lending Act (Jan. 21, 2003), http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/5/56301.pdf.
267. Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-2003-2, Preemption of New York
Predatory Lending Law (Jan. 30, 2003), http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/r.cfm?56301 .pdf.
268. Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-2003-5, Preemption of New
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addition, the OTS has concluded that operating subsidiaries of federal
savings associations enjoy the same preemption as the associations
themselves.2 70
In January 2004, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
issued a regulation preempting state laws governing mortgage lending as
applied to national banks and their operating subsidiaries. 271 The
regulation preempts "state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a
national bank's ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized real
estate lending powers. 27 2 Specifically, the regulation preempts state
law limitations on licensing and registration, insurance requirements,
loan-to-value ratios, amortization, payments, terms, escrow accounts,
disclosures, due-on-sale clauses, and other matters.27 3 Therefore, the
regulation would preempt state predatory lending statutes.2 74
In another rule finalized on the same day, the OCC amended its
Visitation means "the act of
regulation on visitorial powers.27 5
examining into the affairs of a corporation," 276 and includes "inspection;
superintendence; direction; [and] regulation., 277 The OCC has defined
visitorial power as "(i) examination of a bank; (ii) inspection of a bank's
books and records; (iii) regulation and supervision of activities
authorized or permitted pursuant to federal banking law; and (iv)
enforcing compliance with any applicable federal or state laws
concerning those activities. ' '278 The amended regulation provides that
"the OCC has exclusive visitorial authority with respect to the content

Jersey Predatory Lending Law (July 22, 2003), http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/r.cfm?56301 .pdf.

269. Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-2003-6, Preemption of New
Mexico Home Loan Protection Act (Sept. 2, 2003), http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/r.cfm?56301.pdf.
270. Preemption of Georgia Fair Lending Act, supranote 266 at 2.
271. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904,
1917 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (2005)). On the same day, the OCC issued

regulations preempting state laws in the areas of deposit-taking, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4007, non-mortgage
lending, id.§ 7.4008, and the business of banking generally id. § 7.4009.
272. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (a).
273. Id.
274. In August 2003, the OCC made a preemption determination about the Georgia Act only.

Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264 (Aug. 5, 2003). At that time, The OCC
issued the proposed regulation preempting all state predatory lending laws. 68 Fed. Reg. 46,119 (Aug.

5, 2003).
275.
§ 7.4000).
276.
(S.D.N.Y.
277.

Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency v. Spitzer (OCC), 396 F. Supp. 2d 383, 400
2005) (quoting Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 157-58 (1905)).
Id. at 401 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Youngstown v. Hughes, 6 F. 737, 740 (6th Cir.

1881)).

278. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(2).
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and the conduct of activities authorized for national banks under Federal
law." 2 79 The OCC claims that, pursuant to its regulations, state
authorities do not have any visitorial powers over national banks or their
operating subsidiaries. 280 The rule provides that the OCC has exclusive
authority to initiate either administrative or judicial proceedings
enforcing state law against national banks and their operating
subsidiaries. 281 This amendment goes hand-in-hand with the real estate
lending regulation by making clear the OCC's position that states do not
have visitorial powers to enforce state laws.
The OCC preemption regulation is similar in its scope to the OTS
regulation preempting state lending requirements as related to federal
savings associations. Although the OCC has not formally adopted a rule
of field preemption as did the OTS, the OCC has described its
regulations as having the same preemptive effect as the OTS
regulations.2 82 Thus, according to the regulation, virtually all provisions
of every state predatory lending statute would be preempted.
In an attempt to militate against the effects of preempting state laws
aimed at curbing mortgage lending abuses, the regulation adds certain
limits. The regulation prohibits national banks from making loans
"based predominantly on the bank's realization of the foreclosure or
liquidation value of the borrower's collateral, without regard to the
borrower's ability to repay the loan., 283 In addition, the regulation
prohibits practices that would be unfair or deceptive under the Federal
Trade Commission Act.284 However, because banks were already
subject to FTC trade regulations, the OCC regulation adds very little.
The OCC has also issued guidelines to assist banks in avoiding
predatory and abusive lending practices. 8 5
The OCC regulation on real estate lending applies to the operating
subsidiaries of national banks as well as national banks themselves. 286 A
279. Id. § 7.4000(a)(3).
280. See Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1900-01, 1913.
281. Seeid.at1897-1900.
282. See 68 Fed. Reg. 46,119, 46,129 n.91 (Aug. 5, 2003); News Release, OCC, 2004-3, OCC
Issues Final Rules on National Bank Preemption and Visitorial
Powers (Jan. 7,2004), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/toolkit/newsrelease.aspx?Doc=ZN918H7T.xml [hereinafter OCC News Release];
Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 234-35.
283. 12 C.F.R. § 34.3(b).
284. Id. § 34.3(c).
285. See OCC Advisory Letter 2003-2, Guidelines for National Banks to Guard Against Predatory
and Abusive Lending Practices (Feb. 21, 2003); OCC Advisory Letter 2003-3, Avoiding Predatory and
Abusive Lending Practices in Brokered and Purchased Loans (Feb. 21, 2003), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/Advlst03.htm.
286. See 66 Fed. Reg. 34,784, 34,788 (July 2, 2001) (citing 12 C.F.R. § 34.1(b)).
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national bank may apply to the OCC to acquire or establish an operating
subsidiary287 and may conduct in an operating subsidiary the same
activities permissible for a national bank. 288 The permitted activities of
an operating subsidiary include "[m]aking loans" and "[p]urchasing,
selling, servicing, or warehousing loans or other extensions of credit, or
interests therein., 289 Therefore, the activities of a subprime mortgage
lender may be conducted in an operating subsidiary of a national bank.
In fact, a number of mortgage companies are operating subsidiaries of
national banks.2 9 °
In promulgating the new regulations, the OCC stated that operating
subsidiaries of national banks had not been involved in predatory
lending. 29 1 However, banks can now transfer mortgage operations to
operating subsidiaries in order to avoid the operation of state predatory
lending statutes and to engage in predatory lending practices. Further,
one concern expressed about the new regulation is the lack of oversight
that the OCC will be able to provide.29 2 So even with the OCC's
prohibitions against predatory lending practices, the question arises as to
the OCC's ability to police operating subsidiaries of national banks as
well as the banks themselves.
B. Recent Developments in Congress
In March 2005, Representative Bob Ney 93 introduced a bill in
Congress that would amend HOEPA to preempt state predatory lending
laws and would otherwise weaken some HOEPA provisions. 294 The
Ney bill would ostensibly provide additional protection under
HOEPA, 295 but the protection lost by preemption of state law exceeds
any protection added by the bill. The bill would lower the points and
fees trigger for defining a high-cost mortgage. 296 The bill adds

287. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(5)(i)(A).
288. Id. § 5.34(e)(1).
289. Id. § 5.34(e)(5)(v)(C), (D).
290. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OPERATING SUBSIDIARIES OF
NATIONAL BANKS (2006), http://www.occ.treas.gov/OpSublist.pdf.
291. See 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1914 (Jan. 13, 2004).
292. See infra notes 486-92 and accompanying text.

293. Ney is a Republican representing the 18th Congressional District of Ohio. See Office of the
Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, Member Information, http://clerk.house.gov/members/index.html.
294. Responsible Lending Act, H.R. 1295, 105th Cong. (2005).

295. The preamble to the bill states that its purpose is to "protect consumers against unfair and
deceptive practices in connection with higher cost mortgage transactions .... ." Id.
296. Id. § 102(b)
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prepayment penalties to the calculation of points and fees, 2 9 7 but
eliminates the current HOEPA restriction on prepayment penalties. 298 It
prohibits an extension of credit without regard to the borrower's ability
to repay, but creates a presumption that a borrower is able to repay the
loan. 299 The bill prohibits single premium credit insurance. 30 0 It
prohibits loan flipping, but provides extensive safe harbor provisions
and exceptions to the prohibition. 30 1 The bill would weaken HOEPA
provisions for assignee liability by creating safe harbors for lenders who
exercise due diligence as defined in the bill.30 2 Most significantly, the
provides that it preempts all state predatory lending
bill expressly
30 3
laws.
bills, 30 4
Other members of Congress have introduced competing
including a bill introduced by Representatives Brad Miller, Mel Watt,
and Barney Frank. 30 5 The Miller-Watt bill would amend HOEPA along
the lines of the North Carolina predatory lending law, offering additional
protection to homeowners without preempting state law. The bill lowers
the points and fees trigger for defining a high-cost mortgage, 30 6 and it
includes yield spread premiums and prepayment penalties in the
definition of points and fees. 30 7 For high-cost loans, the bill prohibits
balloon payments, lending without regard to the borrower's ability to
pay, late fees in excess of four percent, call provisions giving a lender
discretion to accelerate without default, and financing of points and
fees.30 8 For all home mortgage loans, the bill prohibits flipping, single
premium credit insurance, and mandatory arbitration provisions.30 9
The various bills are currently under consideration in the House
Committee on Financial Services. 310 Lending groups support the Ney

297. Id.
298. Id. § 103(a).
299. Id. § 103(g).
300. Id. § 103(h).

301. Id. § 103(i).
302. Id. § 105(e)(2).

303. Id.§ 106.
304. See H.R. 1182, H.R. 1643, H.R. 1994, H.R. 4471, 109th Cong. (2005).
305. Prohibit Predatory Lending Act, H.R. 1182, 109th Cong. (2005). Brad Miller and Mel Watt

are both Democrats from North Carolina, and Barney Frank is a Democrat from Massachusetts. See
Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, Member Information, http://clerk.house.gov/
members/index.html.
306. H.R. 1182, § 2(a).
307. Id. § 2(c).

308. Id. § 3.
309. Id. § 6.
310. See States Shelter Risky Borrowers,supra note 29, at A4.
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bill, particularly provisions preempting state predatory lending laws.3 1'
Consumer advocates support the Miller-Watt bill instead.3 12
C. The Law of Preemption
3 13
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
Congress has the power to preempt state law 3 14 as long as it is acting
within the scope of its constitutionally delegated powers.3 15
Determining whether Congress has preempted state law is a matter of
determining congressional intent. 316 Courts may find express or implied
congressional intent to preempt state law.3 17 The Supreme Court,
however, has created a presumption that areas of the law traditionally
left to the states are not preempted by federal law "unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress. 3 18
Express preemption occurs when Congress includes a preemption
clause in a federal statute explicitly stating its intent to preempt state
law. 319 An example is DIDMCA, which expressly preempts state usury
statutes unless a state has exercised its opt-out right. 320 Another
example is the Ney bill currently before Congress that would expressly
321
preempt state predatory lending statutes.
If a statute does not contain explicit preemption language, courts must

311. See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon,

Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond
Market Association), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage
Brokers).
312. See id.
at 3 (statement of Stella Adams, Board Member, National Community Reinvestment),
4 (statement of Martin Eakes, Chief Executive Officer, Self-Help and the Center for Responsible
Lending).
313. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause provides that "the laws of the United
States... shall be the supreme law of the land; . .. any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to
the contrary notwithstanding." Id.
314. See id.; Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 30 (1996); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
315. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,460 (1991).
316. Barnett, 517 U.S. at 30; Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
317. See Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)

("Congress' intent may be 'explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its
structure and purpose."' (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977))).
318. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), quoted in Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); see also Nina M. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV.
737, 738-39 (2004); Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice with your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in
Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 824 (1995).
319. Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31; Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516; Jones, 430 U.S. at 525.
320. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a)(1) (2000).
321. Responsible Lending Act, H.R. 1295, 105th Cong. (2005).
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determine "whether the federal statute's 'structure and purpose,' or
nonspecific statutory language, nonetheless reveal a clear, but implicit,
pre-emptive intent. 3 22 The courts have identified two types of implied
preemption, labeled conflict preemption and field preemption.32 3
Conflict preemption occurs when an actual conflict between state and
federal law exists.32 4 A conflict exists when compliance with both state
and federal law would be a "physical impossibility" 325 or when state law
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. 3 26 The Supreme Court in Barnett
Bank v. Nelson found a conflict where federal law gave national banks
in small towns the authority to sell insurance and a Florida statute
prohibited national banks from selling insurance.32 7 The Court did not
find a direct conflict because the federal statute did not require banks to
sell insurance, but did find the Florida statute was an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the federal statute's objectives.3 28 HOEPA preempts
state law to the extent that state law is more tolerant than the federal
requirements for loans covered by HOEPA. 329 For example, if state law
permits a lender to charge a higher interest rate on default in a home
mortgage loan regardless of the loan's interest rate, HOEPA's
prohibition against a higher interest rate on default in a HOEPA highcost loan 330 would preempt state law.
Field preemption occurs when a federal statute completely occupies a
particular field, which implies that Congress has withdrawn the power of
states to legislate in that field.3 3' Courts find field preemption when the
scheme of federal regulation is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it" or

322. Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31 (citing Jones, 430 U.S. at 525 and Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de
la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982)).

323. See MeGreal, supra note 318, at 832; Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 22627 (2000).
324. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S.
707, 713 (1985).
325. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963), cited in Barnett, 517
U.S. at 31.
326. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), quoted in Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31.

327. Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31, 37.
328. Id. at31.
329. See I11. Ass'n of Mortgage Brokers v. Office of Banks & Real Estate, 308 F.3d 762, 766 (7th
Cir. 2002) ("[HOEPA] does not itself preempt any state law-except that state laws about the mortgage

transactions defined in § 1602(aa) may not be more tolerant than the federal floor adopted in § 1639.").
330. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c) (2000).
331. See Nelson, supra note 323, at 227.
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the field is one "inwhich the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will332be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on
the same subject.,
Federal regulations can preempt state law to the same extent as
federal statutes. 333 The Supreme Court has held that "'a federal agency
acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may
pre-empt state regulation' and hence render unenforceable state or local
laws that are otherwise not inconsistent with federal law." 334 Congress
can expressly delegate to an agency the power to preempt state law. For
example, the Parity Act gives authority to the OCC and OTS to
designate which of its regulations preempt state law.33 5
The power of an agency to preempt state law does not require express
congressional authorization. 336 If Congress has not expressed its intent
that the agency preempt state law, the question becomes whether the
agency intended to preempt state law, and if so, whether the agency is
acting within the scope of its delegated authority. 337 If regulatory
preemption of state law "represents a reasonable accommodation of
conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by the
statute, [the court] should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute
or its legislative history that
the accommodation is not one that Congress
338
would have sanctioned.,
When a regulation expressly states its intent to preempt state law, 339 a
question arises as to the deference given to the agency's interpretation.
This inquiry is complicated by the sometimes conflicting mandates of
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.340 and Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council.34 1 In Rice, the Supreme Court adopted a presumption

332. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), quoted in Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. de laCuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982).
333. City of New York v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n (FCC), 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988); Fid. Fed, 458

U.S. at 153. See also United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961) (holding that Veterans'
Administration regulations permitting the Administration to pursue a deficiency judgment after
foreclosure and payment on its guaranty preempted Pennsylvania's anti-deficiency statute).
334. FCC,486 U.S. at 63--64 (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 476
U.S. 355, 369 (1986)).
335. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
336. Fid.Fed., 458 U.S. at 154.
337. Id.
338. Shimer, 367 U.S. at 383, quoted in FCC,486 U.S. at 64.
339. Both the OCC and OTS regulations do just this. See Bank Activities and Operations; Real
Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1917 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)
(2005)) (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2005) (OTS).
340. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
341. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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against preemption of state law.342 In Chevron, which was not a
preemption case, the Court held that courts should defer to agency
interpretations of statutes. 343 Therefore, when an agency preempts state
law, the question is whether the presumption against preemption trumps
deference to the agency interpretation or vice versa. The law is not clear
as to how the mandates of these two cases should be reconciled.
Some commentators have suggested that Chevron deference should
yield to the Rice presumption in preemption cases.345 The issue arises in
the context of the OCC and OTS regulations that preempt state law.
D. Authority of the OTS and OCC to Preempt
State PredatoryLending Laws
The question arises as to the authority of the OCC and OTS to
preempt state lending laws including laws regulating predatory lending
practices. While OTS authority to issue broad regulations preempting
state law is settled,34 6 the law regarding OCC authority under its new
regulations is being tested.
Both OCC and OTS regulations include express statements of
preemption.34 7 Therefore, both agencies clearly intend to preempt state
predatory lending statutes. The question then becomes whether the
agencies are acting within the scope of their delegated authority.
However, the analysis of OTS regulations issued under HOLA and OCC
regulations
issued under the National Banking Act (NBA) 348 are not the
9
same.

34

The Supreme Court has held that section 5(a) of HOLA gave OTS's
predecessor agency "plenary authority to issue regulations governing
federal savings and loans., 350 The National Banking Act, however, does
not give the OCC comparable authority.3 5' One court stated the
342. 331 U.S. at 230.
343. 467 U.S. at 866.
344. See Mendelson, supra note 318, at 739; McGreal, supranote 318, at 887.
345.

Mendelson, supra note 318, at 799-800.

346. See infra note 350 and accompanying text.
347. See 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2005) (providing that the regulation "occupies the entire field of
lending for regulation for federal savings associations"); 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (providing that .".state laws
that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank's ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized real
estate lending powers do not apply to national banks.").

348.
349.
350.
supra note
351.

12 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (2000).
See Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 321-24.
Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de laCuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 160 (1982), quoted in Wilmarth,
25, at 322.
See Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 322. But see Howard N. Cayne & Nancy L. Perkins,
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difference as follows: "As to national banks, Congress expressly left
open a field for state regulation and the application of state laws; but as
to federal savings and loan associations, Congress made plenary,
352
preemptive delegation ... leaving no field for state supervision.,
Other federal courts have distinguished the "broad preemptive authority
353
of the OTS and the much more circumscribed power of the OCC.
Commentators differ on whether the new OCC regulations are within
the scope of congressionally delegated power. 354 Federal courts have
not addressed the OCC's authority to preempt state predatory lending
statutes under the new regulations on real estate lending. However,
several federal circuit courts of appeals have upheld the OCC's
preemption of state visitorial power over operating subsidiaries of
national banks as being within the OCC's authority under the National
Banking Act. 355 These cases also found that OCC regulations preempt
state licensing requirements as applied to operating subsidiaries of
national banks.3 56 Even if state predatory lending statutes were held not
to be preempted, states would have difficulty enforcing them without
visitorial powers over banks and their operating subsidiaries.
The focus of this Article, however, is not on whether the OCC is
NationalBank Act Preemption: The OCC'sNew Rules Do Not Pose a Threat to Consumer Protection or
the Dual Banking System, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 365, 391-96 (2004) (arguing that the OCC
does have authority to preempt state law).
352. People v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 319 (S.D. Cal. 1951). Although
only a district court case, other courts including the Supreme Court have cited Coast Federal for its
holding as to the expansive authority of the OTS and its predecessor. See Wilmarth, supra note 25, at
323 n.393 (citing Fid.Fed., 458 U.S. at 145; Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d
1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980); Bank of Am. v. San Francisco, 309 F.3d
551, 558-59 (9th Cir. 2002)).
353. Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 323 (citing N. Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Kearny Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 187 F.2d 564, 567 (3d Cir. 1951); Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558-59; Nat'l State Bank v. Long,
630 F.2d 981, 989 (3d Cir. 1980)).
354. See Cayne & Perkins, supra note 351, at 391-96 (arguing that the OCC does have authority
to preempt state law); Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 287-316 (arguing that the regulations are not within
OCC's authority); Nicholas Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory Preemption of Predatory
Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2274, 2274 (arguing that "the OCC overstepped its congressionally
delegated authority when it promulgated the regulation").
355. See Wachovia Bank v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556, 557 (6th Cir. 2005); Wells Fargo Bank v.
Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2005); Wachovia Bank v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 309 (2d Cir. 2005).
The most recent of these cases, Watters, is typical of their reasoning. In Watters, the court performed its
analysis under Chevron, concluding that the OCC has "authority to preempt state law concerning
operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws would be preempted with respect to the parent
national bank," 431 F.3d at 561 (quoting Burke, 414 F.3d at 318), and that the "regulations reflect a
consistent and well-reasoned approach to preempting state regulation of operating subsidiaries," id. at
563 (quoting Burke, 414 F.3d at 321).
356. See Watters, 431 F.3d at 557; Wells Fargo Bank, 419 F.3d at 967; Burke, 414 F.3d at 310,
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authorized to preempt state predatory lending statutes, but rather on the
normative issue as to whether the OCC should preempt state predatory

lending laws. Part of the answer lies in the involvement of banks in
predatory lending abuses. The OCC claims that banks have not been
involved in predatory lending except to a very minor extent-but
evidence to the contrary exists.
V. INVOLVEMENT OF FEDERALLY SUPPORTED LENDERS
IN THE SUBPRIME AND PREDATORY LENDING MARKETS

A. Banks and Thrifts

Banks and thrifts are, in fact, involved in predatory lending in a
number of ways. Some banks and thrifts or their subsidiaries and
affiliates do originate predatory loans.357 Furthermore, banks and thrifts
can profit from predatory lending by purchasing predatory loans or
securities backed by predatory loans, lending to predatory lenders and

thus financing their predatory lending practices, providing securitization
services to predatory lenders, and 358
steering customers who could qualify
for prime loans to subprime loans.
Some banks and thrifts are subprime lenders, 359 and some have
practiced predatory lending abuses. 360 Banks and thrifts are increasingly
involved in the subprime mortgage market through subsidiaries and
affiliates, 36 1 and some of these subsidiaries and affiliates engage in
357. See NCLC COMMENTS, supra note 25; Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The CRA
Implications of PredatoryLending, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1571, 1575-76 (2002).
358. See NCLC COMMENTS, supra note 25; Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1577-78. See
also HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 45 (discussing bank and thrift involvement in the
subprime market).
359. At the time of HUD/Treasury Joint Report, one percent of FDIC insured institutions were
subprime lenders, defined as lenders with more than twenty-five percent of their equity capital in
subprime loans. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 44.
360. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 348 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating
that the OTS closed Superior Bank because of its predatory lending practices); Arizona v. Hispanic Air
Conditioning & Heating, Inc., CV 2000-003625 (Super Ct. Maricopa County 2003); Clear Lake Nat'l
Bank, San Antonio, Texas, OCC Enforcement Action 2003-135 (Nov. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/FTP/EAs/ea2003-135.pdf (finding violations of HOEPA, RESPA, TILA and
the FTC Act). See also OCC News Release, supra note 282 (Jan. 7, 2004) (quoting John Hawke as
saying, "We have seen only isolated cases of abusive practices among national banks"); NCLC
COMMENTS, supra note 25 (listing cases against national banks for alleged predatory practices).
361. See 1IUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 45. Banks, savings associations, and
their affiliates originated approximately one quarter of all subprime loans in 1998, id., and eight of the
ten largest subprime lenders in 2000 were affiliated with banks, Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at
1585 (citing Robert Julavits, Subprime Risks Extending Beyond Borrowers, AM. BANKER, Mar. 27,
2000, at 9).
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predatory lending practices.3 62 Bank affiliates, including Citigroup and
Household, have paid huge sums to settle complaints of predatory
lending practices.3 63
Borrowers have sued national banks, their
operating subsidiaries, or their affiliates for practices including fraud and
misrepresentation, loan flipping, and violations of HOEPA, the Truth in
Lending Act, the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act, and state
364
consumer protection laws.
When banks or their affiliates make subprime loans, they can steer
customers who would qualify for a prime loan to a subprime loan or to
their subprime affiliate.3 6 5
Citibank and other banks and their
subsidiaries were under investigation by the New York attorney general
for steering customers to subprime loans until the OCC intervened and
the investigation was enjoined.36 6 Banks profit when borrowers pay
more for credit than they should have to pay based on their credit
histories.
Banks and thrifts also purchase predatory loans to hold or securitize
or purchase securities backed by predatory loans. 367 When banks
purchase predatory loans, they can generally take advantage of the
holder-in-due-course doctrine unless the loans are high-cost mortgages
as defined by HOEPA.
When they purchase mortgage-backed
securities, they are further insulated from liability. 368 Thus, banks and
thrifts can profit from purchasing predatory loans or securities backed by
predatory loans without concern for liability.
Banks have recently played an important role in securitizing subprime
loans "because of their access to credit markets and their expertise in
securitizing mortgages." 369 Banks may "serve as underwriters, trustees,
registrars and paying agents for securitizations of subprime loans, some
of which may be predatory., 370 National banks have served as trustees
for notorious predatory lenders including
Associates, Household
37
Finance, Delta Funding, and First Alliance. '
Finally, banks may finance predatory lenders through warehouse lines

362. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 12, 17, and 24 and accompanying text.

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

See NCLC COMMENTS, supra note 25, at 4-6.
See Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1578-80.
See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
See NCLC COMMENTS, supra note 25; Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1577.
See supra Part IV.E.

369. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 45.

370. Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1577.
371. See NCLC COMMENTS, supra note 25.
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of credit secured by the predatory loans. 3 72 With a warehouse line of
credit, a mortgage company uses borrowed funds to originate mortgage
loans that will eventually be packaged and sold on the secondary market
or securitized.373
Therefore, banks can facilitate the practices of
predatory lenders by lending them the funds they use to make predatory
loans. When banks hold predatory loans as security for a line of credit,
they can again take advantage of the holder-in-due-course doctrine
unless the loans are high-cost mortgages as defined by HOEPA.
Banks and thrifts receive a number of federal benefits not available to
others involved in the business of home mortgage lending. Banks and
thrifts receive a gross federal subsidy from the federal safety net, which
includes federal deposit insurance as well as access to the Federal
Reserve's discount window and payment system.3 74 First, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insures deposits of member
institutions up to $100,000, 37' and deposit insurance is backed by the
full faith and credit of the federal government. 376 As a result, banks and
thrifts can attract deposits for lower interest rates than uninsured
institutions because the deposits are insured by the federal government.
Even uninsured deposits have protection through the federal
government's bank resolution practices.3 77 In addition, banks and thrifts
have access to the Federal Reserve system. The Federal Reserve's

372. See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 45; Engel & McCoy, supra note 357,
at 1577.
373. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 152, at 487. After each mortgage loan is made, the
note and deed of trust are temporarily pledged to the bank as collateral for the line of credit. It is called
a warehouse line of credit because "the mortgage loans are 'parked' in the bank's 'warehouse' for a
short period (perhaps 30 to 90 days) until the mortgage company is ready to sell them to secondary
market investors or securitize them." Id.
374. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1586; Frederick Furlong, Federal Subsidies in
Banking. The Link to FinancialModernization, ECON. LTR. No. 97-31 (Fed. Res. Bank, San Francisco,
C.A.) Oct. 24, 1997, availableat http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/e197-3 1.html; Kenneth Jones &
Barry Kolatch, The Federal Safety Net, Banking Subsidies, and Implications for Financial
Modernization, 12 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 1 (1999); Bevis Longstreth & Ivan E. Mattei, Organizational
Freedom for Banks: The Case in Support, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1895, 1895, 1917 (1997); Bernard Shull
& Lawrence J. White, The Right Corporate Structure for Expanded Bank Activities, 115 BANKING
L.J.446, 466 (1998); John R. Walter, Can a Safety Net Subsidy Be Contained?, 84 FED. RES. BANK
RICHMOND ECON. Q., Winter 1998, at 1,2.
375. See PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS AND THRIFTS § 8.03 [1][b][ii] (2d ed. 2001 & cum. supps.). Bank
deposits are insured by the Bank Insurance Fund and thrift deposits by the Savings Association
Insurance Fund, both of which are administered by the FDIC and are funded with premiums paid by
banks and thrifts, respectively. Jones & Kolatch, supra note 374, at 3 n.3.
376. Jones & Kolatch, supranote 374, at 3. Resort to the full faith and credit of the U.S. Treasury
was necessary to resolve the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. See id.
377. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1586.
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discount window provides a backup source of credit to banks,3 78 and the
Federal Reserve's payment system includes overdraft protection for
interbank transfers on Fedwire. 379 In addition to the federal safety net,
banks' and thrifts' charters give them a quasi-oligopoly because
entry by
380
new competitors is controlled by government regulators.
In exchange for the benefits they receive, banks and thrifts are highly
regulated. National banks are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency. 381 A primary aim of bank regulation is "to ensure the
safe and sound practices and operations of individual banking
382
institutions" and, therefore, to protect taxpayers and depositors.
"[Banks have] high regulatory compliance costs, including examination
and reporting requirements, reserve requirements, and risk-adjusted
deposit insurance premiums (although risk-adjusted premiums have
been essentially toothless in recent years because most banks pay zero
premiums). 3 83 Thrift institutions also are heavily regulated by the
384
Office of Thrift Supervision.
Whether federal banks and thrifts receive a net federal subsidy or, in
other words, whether federal benefits that banks and thrifts receive
outweigh regulatory costs, is the subject of debate.38 5
Some
commentators have concluded that a net subsidy exists in bad economic
times and that the subsidy is zero or slightly negative in good economic
times. 386 The fc
fact that banks choose to retain their charters provides
some evidence that they at least believe the federal subsidy outweighs
the regulatory cost. 387 The same evidence exists with respect to thrifts.
Recent federal preemption of state law changes the balance in
determining the existence of a net federal subsidy because federal

378. See Jones & Kolatch, supra note 374, at 3.
379. See id.
380. See MCCOY, supranote 375, § 3.01; Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1586.
381. See McCoY, supra note 375, § 2.02[2][a]. State chartered banks are regulated by their
state's banking agency as well as the Federal Reserve, in the case of state member banks, or the FDIC,
in the case of state nonmember banks. Id.
382. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 152, at 900 (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
BANK OVERSIGHT STRUCTURE: U.S. AND
MODERNIZING U.S. STRUCTURE (1996)).

FOREIGN EXPERIENCE

MAY OFFER

LESSONS FOR

383. Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1587.
384. See McCoY, supranote 375, § 2.02[2][b].
385. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1586-88; Furlong, supra note 374; Jones & Kolatch,
supranote 374, at 9-10; Longstreth & Mattei, supra note 374, at 1918-19; Walter, supra note 374, at 9.
386. See MCCOY, supra note 375, § 4.02; Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1587; Shull &
White, supra note 374, at 466-67. In addition, banks engaging in riskier activities receive a larger
subsidy than do safer banks. Jones & Kolatch, supra note 374, at 9.
387. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1587; Furlong, supra note 374.
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preemption reduces regulatory costs for national banks and for thrifts.
In fact, some predatory lenders have sought federal charters because of
the benefits of federal preemption of state law. 388 "Associates and
Commercial Credit applied for thrift charters in late 1997 and early
1998. Both companies stated that federal preemption of individual state
regulations accorded federal savings associations was one reason for
their application." 389 The OTS preemption of state lending laws for
thrifts used to be an advantage of choosing a thrift charter over a bank
charter. 390 But now the OCC has evened the playing field by similarly
preempting state laws for the benefit of banks that will reduce their
regulatory compliance costs. The visitorial powers preemption also
reduces regulatory compliance costs. Thus, the reduction in regulatory
costs increases the likelihood that a net federal subsidy does exist.
What is the relationship between any net federal subsidy and bank
involvement in predatory lending? Certainly when banks or thrifts make
predatory loans, purchase predatory loans, purchase securities backed by
predatory loans, or finance predatory lenders with warehouse lines of
credit, they are profiting to the detriment of affected homeowners. In
addition, bank affiliates involved in predatory lending activities may
enjoy a spillover of any net federal subsidy. 391 A spillover may occur
when a bank lends money to its affiliate or shifts riskier activities from
an affiliate to the bank.3 92

Regardless of whether predatory lenders receive a benefit from any
federal subsidy, banks and thrifts should avoid direct or indirect
involvement in predatory lending activities. Banks enjoy a special status
of trust in the minds of the public, which is perpetuated by the gross
federal subsidy. Banks should not betray that trust by engaging in
predatory lending activities or advancing the interests of predatory
lenders. Furthermore, thrifts and national banks should not be exempt
from state consumer protection laws aimed at stemming the tide of
predatory lending activities.
Banks are not the only entities involved in residential mortgage
lending that receive special federal benefits. Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac also receive federal benefits and are subject to more federal
regulation than purely private entities involved in mortgage lending.

388. HUD/TREASURY JOtNT REPORT, supra note 31, at 45 n.54.

389.
390.
391.
392.
supra note

Id.
See MCCOY, supra note 375, § 3.02.
See id.§ 4.02; Walter, supra note 374, at 9-10.
See MCCOY, supra note 375, § 4.02; Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1587-88; Walter,
374, at 9-10.
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But Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have taken an entirely different
approach to the problem of predatory lending.
B. FannieMae and FreddieMac
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored
enterprises-privately owned corporations operating under federal
charters that impose restrictions on their activities and grant benefits that
other private corporations do not enjoy. The President appoints five of
the eighteen directors of both Fannie Mae 393 and Freddie Mac, 394 while
the rest are elected by shareholders. Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
are regulated by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO) and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). The benefits they receive as GSEs include exemption from state
taxes, except for real property taxes,39 5 and exemption from federal
Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not
securities laws.39 6
government agencies, their guarantees are not backed by the full faith
and credit of the federal government; however, an assumption has
existed that the federal government would honor their obligations in the
event of financial trouble. 397 Whether the federal government would in
fact rescue the GSEs is debatable.
Fannie Mae was the first GSE, originating during the Great
Depression under the New Deal leadership of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt. In response to problems of widespread foreclosures during
the Depression and wide variation across the country in interest rates
and availability of mortgages, President Roosevelt's National
Emergency Council recommended the establishment of a program for
long-term, federally insured mortgages and the creation of national
Congress
mortgage associations to purchase these mortgages. 398
393.
394.
395.
396.

12 U.S.C. § 1723(b) (2000).
Id. § 1452(a)(2)(A).
Id. § 1433.
Id. § 1455(g), 1723(c).

397. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOUSING ENTERPRISES: POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF

SEVERAL GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP 17 (1996). See also Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Chief Urges
Cutback in Scale of 2 Big Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2005, at Cl ("Mr. Greenspan, who has long
criticized both companies, said they had been able to borrow almost unlimited amounts of money at
below-market rates by virtue of the widespread but false impression among investors that the federal
government would ride to their rescue if necessary.").
398. Regulations Implementing Authority of HUD over Conduct of Secondary Market Operations
of FNMA, 43 Fed. Reg. 36,200, 36,200 (Sept. 14, 1978). Until the 1930s, the typical home mortgage
loan was for only a three- to five-year term. Id. Homeowners were required to refinance their homes
frequently, and during the Great Depression when refinancing was not available, many lost their homes
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responded by creating the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to
insure home mortgage loans and authorizing the charter of mortgage
associations to purchase the insured mortgages.39 9 In 1938, Congress
chartered the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA, now
called Fannie Mae). 40 0 FNMA was initially a government agency that
issued bonds to raise funds for the purchase of FHA-insured mortgages
and, beginning in 1944, Veteran's Administration (VA)-guaranteed
mortgages as well. 40 ' In 1968, Congress divided the functions of Fannie
Mae between two entities-Fannie Mae, which became a GSE and was
allocated the secondary market operations of the former entity, and the
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), which
remained a division of HUD and was given the special assistance and
the management and liquidation functions of the former Fannie Mae.40 2
In 1970, the Emergency Home Finance Act created a new GSE, the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and also
authorized Fannie Mae to purchase conventional mortgages.40 3 Freddie
40 4
Mac started the trend towards mortgage securitization in the 1970s,
while Fannie Mae continued to purchase mortgage loans to be held in 40its5
portfolio. Fannie Mae became involved in securitization in the 1980s.
Today, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are almost identical in their
charters and functions. They both purchase home loans to hold in their
portfolios but securitize even more loans.
Through their purchases and securitization of residential mortgage
loans, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together provide the largest source
of home mortgage financing in the nation. For example, in 2001 Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac together purchased or securitized forty percent of
all conventional mortgages originated that year.40 6
Fannie Mae

to foreclosure.
399. See id. at 36,200-01 (citing National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 479, 48 Stat. 1252
(1934)).
400. See id at 36,201. The association was originally named the National Mortgage Association
of Washington, but was renamed the Federal National Mortgage Association later the same year. Id.
401. See id.
402. See id. at 36,202 (citing Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448,
§ 802(c), 82 Stat. 476, 536 (1968) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1716(h) (2000)).
403. Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 201, 84 Stat. 450, 450-51 (1971) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1717 (2000)).
404. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
405. See Colletta & Shenker, supra note 166, at 1385; Andrew R. Berman, Once a Mortgage,
Always a Mortgage-The Use (and Misuse) of Mezzanine Loans and Preferred Equity Investments, I I
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 76, 92 (2005).
406. VALERIE L. SMITH ET AL., OFFICE OF FED. Hous. ENTER. OVERSIGHT, MORTGAGE MARKETS
AND THE ENTERPRISES IN 2001 13 (2002).
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purchased $568 billion of residential mortgage loans and issued $515
billion of mortgage-backed securities in 2001, while Freddie Mac
purchased $393 billion of residential mortgage loans and issued $387
billion of mortgage-backed securities in the same year.40 7 Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac thus facilitate the flow of money into the residential
mortgage market in accordance with the purposes set out in their
charters.
In the late 1980s, housing advocates believed that the underwriting
guidelines used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac favored white suburban
homebuyers.40 8 In response, Congress enacted the Federal Housing
Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 (FHEFSSA) to
give Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac incentives to increase their purchase
of loans to low- and moderate-income families and in low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods. 40 9 FHEFSSA required HUD to set
affordable housing goals for loans purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac4 10 with the intention that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac "lead the
industry in affordable lending." 4 1 1 It also prohibited them from
discriminating on the basis of certain proscribed factors.4 12 Finally,
FHEFSSA established the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight
as an office of HUD to monitor both Fannie Mae and Freddie
13
Mac.

4

A recent HUD-sponsored study considered the impact of the
affordable housing goals required by the FHEFSSA on low- and
moderate-income families.4 14 The study found that the goals helped
make homeownership more attainable for these families. 415 In response
to FHEFSSA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac adopted more flexible

407. Id. at 13, 17.
408. BRENT W. AMBROSE & THOMAS G. THIBODEAU, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., AN
ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF THE GSE AFFORDABLE GOALS ON Low- AND MODERATE-INCOME
FAMILIES 2 (2002).
409. Pub. L. No. 102-550, tit. 13.
410. Id. § 1331(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4561(a) (2000)). HUD set goals for loans secured by
homes of low- and moderate-income homeowners/renters at 50% and loans located in underserved areas
at 31%. See AMBROSE & THIBODEAU, supra note 408, at vii.
411. See AMBROSE & THIBODEAU, supra note 408, at vii. See also HUD's Housing Goals for the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac) for the Years 2005-2008 and Amendments to HUD's Regulation of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, 69 Fed. Reg. 63,580, 63,741 (Nov. 2, 2004) (discussing factors indicating "the
GSEs' ability to lead the industry in affordable lending").
412. See Pub. L. No. 102-550, tit. 13, § 1325(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4545).

413. Id.§ 1311 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4511).
414. AMBROSE & THIBODEAU, supranote 408, at vii.
415. Id. at ix.
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underwriting standards and introduced automated underwriting systems
which reduced underwriting costs. As a result, lenders that sell loans to
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began using more flexible underwriting
standards that permitted more borrowers to qualify for the loans. 4 16 In
addition, purchases by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac of loans to lowerincome borrowers and in target neighborhoods increased liquidity and
allowed additional lending activity to these borrowers and in these
neighborhoods.4 17 The study suggests that the affordable housing goals
have thus helped make homeownership more attainable to low- and
moderate-income families.
In the late 1990s, both GSEs were accused of being involved in the
predatory lending problem by purchasing and securitizing subprime
loans that could be characterized as predatory. Both Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac responded immediately with initiatives to avoid purchasing
or securitizing predatory loans.4 18 Fannie Mae will not purchase or
securitize loans with points and fees in excess of five percent, loans
identified as "high-cost" mortgages under HOEPA, loans with prepaid
single premium credit insurance, or loans with prepayment premiums
unless the borrower has received a benefit.41 9 Fannie Mae requires its
lenders to determine the borrower's ability to repay, avoid steering
borrowers to higher-cost loans if they qualify for a lower-cost loan,
report a borrower's entire payment history to credit repositories (to
improve the borrower's credit history), and maintain escrow deposit
accounts. 420 Freddie Mac will not purchase HOEPA loans, loans with
single premium credit insurance, loans with prepayment penalties that
continue for more than three years, or loans with mandatory arbitration
clauses. 42 1 Freddie Mac requires its lenders to report a borrower's entire
payment history to credit repositories and refuses to purchase loans from
lenders that engage in predatory lending practices.4 22

416. Id.at vii-ix.

417. Id.at ix.
418. See News Release, Fannie Mae, Fannie Mae Chairman Announces New Loan Guidelines to
Combat Predatory Lending Practices (Apr. 11, 2000), http://www.fanniemae.com/newsreleases/2000/
0710.jhtml [hereinafter Fannie Mae News Release] (citing Lender Letter LL03-00, Eligibility of

Mortgages to Borrowers with Blemished Credit Histories, 4/11/00); News Release, Freddie Mac,
Freddie Mac Announces Steps to Protect Borrowers from Predatory Lending Practices (Mar. 24, 2000),
http://www.freddiemac.com/news/ archives2000/predatory.htm.
419. See Fannie Mae News Release, supra note 418.
420. See id.
421. See FREDDIE MAC, COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING, FREDDIE MAC'S EFFORTS TO
PROTECT AMERICA'S CONSUMERS (2005), http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/anti-predatory.html.

422. See id.
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More recently, the GSEs have been criticized on the basis that they
fail to "lead the industry in affordable housing. 42 3 While the GSEs
have become involved in the subprime market, their involvement has
been primarily limited to purchasing loans to A- borrowers.42 4 They
have not purchased or securitized loans to B, C, and D rated borrowers.
to become involved in subprime
HUD has encouraged both GSEs 425
mortgage lending to a greater extent.
Several states exempted the GSEs from the application of their
predatory lending statutes or limited the application of the statutes to the
GSEs. 426 The GSEs sought exemption from Georgia's statute before it
was enacted, but received negative publicity for doing SO.4 2 7 As a result,
they withdrew their proposal and have since avoided seeking additional
exemptions or limitations.4 2 8 Thus, the GSEs have continued to
purchase and securitize loans in all fifty states in compliance with state
predatory lending statutes in those states that have such statutes and
have not exempted the GSEs.
The GSEs, therefore, have taken a very different approach to the
problem of predatory lending from that of banks and thrifts. The GSEs
have become involved in the purchase and securitization of subprime
loans, have adopted policies designed to avoid the purchase of loans
with predatory terms, and have remained for the most part subject to
compliance with state laws. National banks and thrifts, on the other
hand, claim their hands are clean and have now avoided the requirement
of complying with state law. In the defense of banks, they have been
involved in the subprime market beyond the A- credit level. However,
by avoiding compliance with state law, some banks can remain a part of
the problem.

423. David S. Hilzenrath, HUD Chief CriticizedFannie Mae, Minority Loans Called Inadequate,
WASH. POST, July 2, 2004, at E02. In recent years, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been criticized

on numerous fronts. They have been criticized on the basis that they have an unfair competitive
advantage over wholly private mortgage investors, based on concerns about their financial stability and
the feared effects of their failure on the national economy, and because of misleading financial
disclosures. See Andrews, supra note 397, at Cl; Stephen Labaton, Limits Urged in Mortgage
Portfolios, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at C1.
424. See GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 74; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at

46. The GSEs also purchase loans to "Alt-A" borrowers, "prime borrowers who desire low down
payments or do not want to provide full documentation for loans." Id at 46 n.56.
425. See Hilzenrath, supra note 423, at E02.
426. See, e.g., D.C. and California; see also Donald C. Lampe, Predatory Lending Initiatives,
Legislation and Litigation: Federal Regulation, State Law and Preemption, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.

REP. 78, 84 (2002).
427. Patrick Barta, Fannie Mae in Tiff Over Abusive Loans, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2002, at Al.
428. See Lampe, supra note 426, at 84.
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VI.

FEDERAL LAW SHOULD NOT PREEMPT
STATE PREDATORY LENDING STATUTES

Although some commentators question the validity of the OCC's
preemption of state lending laws for national banks,4 29 no doubt exists
that Congress may if it chooses preempt state predatory lending statutes
altogether or may expressly grant to federal agencies the power to
preempt the statutes as applied to banks and thrifts. The issue then is the

normative case for federal preemption of state predatory lending lawsthat is, whether Congress should preempt state predatory lending laws
for all lenders, as would the bill currently before it, and whether federal
agencies should preempt the laws for thrifts, banks, and their operating
subsidiaries.
A. States' TraditionalRole in Real Estate Finance
and Consumer Protection
Real estate finance law was traditionally an area governed by the
states. Although the federal government became involved in creating

housing policies and housing programs during the New Deal, it was only
in the 1960s that the federal government first became involved in direct
regulation of real estate finance. 430 Most of the early statutes were
disclosure laws that created a minimum standard.43 ' Congress made
clear that these statutes were only to preempt state law to the extent of a

conflict.43 2 Although Congress has acted in several areas to expressly
preempt state law,43 3 the bulk of law governing real estate finance
remains state law.
Consumer protection has also traditionally been primarily a state

responsibility.

While the federal government has been involved in

specific areas of consumer protection, particularly through the FTC,
429. See supra Part IV.D.
430. See Alexander, supra note 238, at 311-13.
431. See, e.g., Truth-in-Lending Act of 1968 (TILA), Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. 1, 82 Stat. 146
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (2000)); Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act of
1974 (RESPA), Pub. L. No. 93-533, § 4, 88 Stat. 1724, 1725 (1974) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 2603 (2000)). See also KATHLEEN KEEST, THE CONSUMER LENDING REVOLUTION: ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES, THE REGULATORY & LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 2, http://www.responsiblelending.org/
pdfs/LegislativeFramework-1204.pdf ("[TILA and RESPA] were additions to, not substitutes for, the
substantive regulation in state law. Disclosure was not the endgame, and federal law generally set the
floor, not the ceiling.").
432. See Alexander, supra note 238, at 315.
433. See DIDMCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1735f -7a (2000); Parity Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3803 (2000); Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (2000).
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these measures have traditionally been in addition to state consumer
protection laws and treated as creating a minimum standard rather than
preempting the field.434 HOEPA creates a minimum standard but does
435
not otherwise preempt state law.
Because of the tradition of state governance of real estate finance and
consumer protection laws, advocates of federal preemption of state law
bear the burden to support a change in policy and show that federal
regulation would be superior. While there are advantages to uniformity,
they are not outweighed by the benefits of letting each state choose its
approach to the problem of predatory lending.
B. The Role of State and FederalGovernment
1. Our Federal System
Numerous advantages exist to a system of varying state laws, and the
Supreme Court outlined those advantages in Gregory v. Ashcroft:
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people
numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will be
more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for
more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes
government more436responsive by putting the States in competition for a
mobile citizenry.
The fact that different states have reacted differently to the problem of
predatory lending indicates a need for various solutions. The fifty states
vary along racial, religious, and cultural lines,43 7 and the differences
among the states have resulted in varying political climates and differing
approaches to societal issues. 438 The differences are apparent in the
types of consumer protection measures a state may adopt for home
mortgage borrowers. Some states take an activist approach to protecting

434. Sometimes federal law is more protective than state law.

See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss

Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (2000) (restricting disclaimers of implied warranties in consumer
transactions).
435. See Ill. Ass'n of Mortgage Brokers v. Office of Banks & Real Estate, 308 F.3d 762, 766 (7th
Cir. 2002), quoted in supra note 329.
436. 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (citing Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the
Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee
Clause and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3-10 (1988)).
437. See Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in the
1900s and the Implicationsof ChangingFinancialMarkets, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261, 1301 (1991).

438. Id.
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consumers with statutory rights of redemption,439 one-action rules,44 0
stringent limitations on deficiency judgments, 44 1 and strong predatory
lending laws.4 42 Other states take a more "hands off" approach favoring

business interests.
State legislatures can respond to their citizens in a way that the federal
government cannot. Congress may enact laws that are responsive to the

needs of most Americans but that may not be responsive to the needs of
the particular state's citizens. Two empirical studies suggest that state
legislators are responsive to public opinion in their states." 3 Not
surprisingly, the studies conclude that laws of more liberal states reflect

liberal policies while the laws of conservative states reflect more
conservative policies.44 4 Therefore, legislatures in more liberal states

may enact tougher consumer protection measures, while legislatures in
more conservative states may regulate subprime lenders to a lesser
degree.
Another advantage of state regulation is that it allows for
experimentation.4 4 5 When one state finds an effective solution, others

may

follow. 446

When a state chooses an ineffective approach, it affects

fewer people than would a federal law.44 7 Additionally, states can learn
from the mistakes made in other states.
Critics of state predatory lending statutes say that state legislatures
439. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1282 (2003); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 729.010-90, 726(e);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2414 (1994); MINN. STAT. §§ 580.23, 580.24 (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 668-101, 66-8-102 (2004).
440. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 726(a); NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.430 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-37-1 (2002).
441. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 726(b); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.36 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 57-1-32 (Supp. 2005).
442. See supra notes Part ll.B.
443. Schill, supra note 437, at 1311-12. One study used the percentage of votes for George
McGovern in the 1972 presidential election to indicate the liberal or conservative nature of a state
compared with liberal state policies. David C. Nice, Representation in the States: Policymaking and
Ideology, 64 Soc. Sci. Q. 404, 405-06 (1983). The other study used a survey which asked residents of
different states whether they considered themselves to be liberal, conservative or moderate and
compared the results with state policies. Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Robert S. Erikson & John P. Mclver,
Public Opinion and Policy Liberalism in the American States, 31 AM. J. POL. SI. 980, 985 (1987).
444. See Nice, supra note 443, at 408; Wright et al., supra note 443, at 989.
445. See generally Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as
Laboratoriesof Experimentation,57 FLA. L. REV. 295 (2005).
446. For example, North Carolina's predatory lending statute has been emulated, and the assignee
liability provisions of Georgia's law have been copied. See supra notes 127 and 143 and accompanying
text.
447. Georgia legislators obviously felt that they had made a mistake in the original statute, but
only the people of Georgia were affected and only for a short time. See supra notes 140-41 and
accompanying text.
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cannot react quickly enough to remedy ineffective attempts at stemming
predatory lending practices and may, therefore, cut off the flow of
legitimate credit to their states. However, experience has shown that
state legislatures are able to react quickly. For example, when state law
threatened to restrict the44availability
of credit in Georgia, the legislature
8
law.
the
revised
quickly
Today, state legislatures are more able to react quickly and
responsively to state concerns. New or amended constitutions in many
states now permit annual sessions of the legislature and have removed
limits on the length of sessions. 449 Lawmakers have higher salaries and
professional staffs available to assist them, 450 providing legislatures with
more adequate resources to react to state needs and constituents' desires.
2. Law Enforcement
Federal law enforcement has been very successful in prosecuting the
largest predatory lending offenders, 451 but states are more effective in
prosecuting local and smaller actors.45 2 The FTC and Federal Reserve
Board are unlikely to prosecute small, localized mortgage bankers and
mortgage brokers. They are simply too small to attract the attention of
these large federal actors who generally allocate their resources to the
larger offenders. Yet, very often the local mortgage bankers, mortgage
brokers, and contractors are at the root of the predatory lending
problem.4 53 State attorneys general and local officials, on the -other
hand, are equipped to prosecute the small actors. Also, state and federal
governments can more effectively work together if the hands of state
and local officials are not tied.
3. Federal Law as a Minimum Standard
The tradition of federal law in the areas of real estate finance and
consumer protection has been to set the minimum standard.4 54 HOEPA
448. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
449. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE QUESTION OF STATE
GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY 45-49 (1985), cited in Schill, supranote 437, at 1306.
450. See Schill, supra note 437, at 1307 (citing Alan Rosenthal, The Legislative Institution:
Transformedand at Risk, in THE STATE OF THE STATES 69, 73-75 (Carl E. Van Horn ed., 1989) and
JEFFREY R. HENIG, PUBLIC POLICY AND FEDERALISM 40 (1985)).

451. See supra notes 12-15 and 105-08 and accompanying text.
452. See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 83.

453. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
454. See supra Part VI.A.
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was enacted in this tradition, and states have been free to set higher
standards. Thus, some state legislatures have felt a need to protect their

residents by enacting additional, stronger measures.

Other state

legislatures have enacted state laws with the same level of protection as
HOEPA, while still others have not acted at all.455

A stronger federal law as minimum standard would eliminate the need
for individual states to act. However, a significantly stronger federal
law is unlikely in today's political climate.4 56

The Ney bill before

Congress would weaken HOEPA, while at the same time expressly
preempting state predatory lending laws.4 57 If Congress continues to set
a low minimum standard, then states should be free to act. If Congress

wants uniformity, then it needs to set a higher bar.
C. "Onerous" Provisions of State Statutes

One of the objections that proponents of preemption have to state
predatory lending statutes is that their terms are too burdensome for

lenders.458 Advocates for the subprime lending industry argue that
borrowers should have the option to choose a prepayment penalty
provision in order to get a lower interest rate4 59 and that yield spread

premiums should not be included in the trigger for determining a highcost loan because the fees benefit homeowners. 460

They argue that

homeowners should have more choices while ignoring the reality that
the unsophisticated homeowners who fall victim to predatory lenders do
not have the bargaining power or the understanding to make meaningful
choices.
Critics of state regulation of predatory lending are particularly
opposed to the extension of liability to assignees of predatory loans.4 61

455. See supra Part II.B.
456. Congress recently enacted a Bankruptcy Reform bill that is not favorable to debtors.
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23
(codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
457. See supra notes 293-303 and accompanying text.
458. See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon,
Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond
Market Association), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage
Brokers).
459. See id. at 4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable
Lending).
460. See id. at 6 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable
Lending), 3 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage Brokers).
461. See id. at 8 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable
Lending), 4 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond Market Association).
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Regarding the issue of assignee liability, the experiences of Georgia and
New Jersey are illuminating. When liability for assignees went too far,
the rating agencies would not rate securities, so lenders would not lend.
But under Georgia's current regime of assignee liability, as well as in
New Jersey, the rating agencies have continued to rate securities, and
lenders have continued to lend.
Creation of assignee liability is one of the most effective means of
dealing with predatory lenders. The parties that buy and securitize
mortgage loans are involved in multiple transactions, while consumers
are not. Consumers cannot simply go to another lender after a bad
experience with the first, but the parties who purchase loans to securitize
them or hold them in portfolio can. Also, investors can and do protect
themselves with buyback provisions.462 As a result, purchasers of
mortgage loans on the secondary market are the parties best equipped to
police the originators.
Assertions of the need for uniformity may be a smoke screen for those
who simply want lower standards of consumer protection. 46 3 The
conservative lawmakers pushing for federal preemption are the same
lawmakers who would usually champion states rights and favor state law
over federal law. The current Republican-dominated Congress has
shown itself more likely to adopt measures that are less consumerfriendly than some states. Preemption of state law is, therefore, one way
to support lending interests and ensure a low level of consumer
protection. The result, of course, is that predatory lending practices
continue with little effective curtailment.

462. See Eggert, supra note 149, at 548.
463. See Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending:
DeregulatoryAgenda, 78 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 8 (2005).

Unmasking the

If uniformity in predatory lending laws is desirable, then another approach is through uniform state
law. Through the uniform law adoption process, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws can consider the views of the various interest groups. They can also consider the
success and failure of various state approaches. With a uniform act available, state legislatures are still
be flexible and responsive to the needs of their constituents by making changes to the uniform act or by
not adopting it at all.
Attempts to promulgate broad uniform statutes covering real estate finance have not been effective.
No state adopted either the Uniform Land Transactions Act adopted by NCCUSL in 1974 or the
Uniform Land Security Interest Act adopted by NCCUSL in 1985. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra

note 152, at 670. In 2002, the NCCUSL promulgated the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act. It has
yet to be adopted by any state. More limited attempts at reform have been effective, however, with
states adopting uniform acts relating to condominiums and risk of loss in real estate contracts. See id. at
91. A uniform act regulating predatory lending practices might be an effective means for making the
law more uniform while preserving the ability of states to be responsive to their citizens. A
disadvantage would be the lengthy time frame that drafting and adoption would require.

2006]

MORTGAGING THE AMERICAN DREAM

1365

D. Availability of Credit
Critics of state predatory lending statutes say that they will reduce the
amount of available subprime credit.4 64 Measures addressing predatory
lending do, indeed, keep some loans from being made. Some loans,
however, simply should not be made because their terms are too onerous
or unfair. In some cases, the borrower could obtain a loan on better
terms from a legitimate subprime lender. If the borrower cannot repay
the loan, however, the borrower should not be extended credit. In the
legitimate subprime lending market, A- borrowers typically pay interest
rates that are about one-half of a percent higher than prime borrowers. C
and D borrowers pay interest rates as much as four percent above prime
rates.46 5 Lenders who charge much higher interest rates on fully secured
home mortgage loans are simply taking advantage of borrowers.
Furthermore, critics of state predatory lending statutes have not
provided evidence that the statutes have reduced the availability of
legitimate subprime credit. In fact, North Carolina proves otherwise.
Since the North Carolina statute became effective in 2000, subprime
loans have remained available, while the incidence of predatory loans
and loans with unfair terms has decreased.4 6 6 Certainly, the proponents
of federal preemption who seek to remove state control over local
predatory lending problems have the burden to prove that the state
statutes do in fact affect the availability of subprime credit.
E. Efficiency Concerns
Proponents of federal preemption assert that the mortgage market
cannot operate efficiently with a patchwork of state requirements.46 7
Lenders argue that it is too burdensome to comply with different
requirements in each state. They argue that the cost of compliance will
increase the cost or limit the availability of credit.
464. See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon,

Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond
Market Association), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage
Brokers).
465. See HUDTREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 28.
466. See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 2 (statement of Martin Eakes, Chief

Executive Officer, Self-Help and the Center for Responsible Lending).
accompanying text.

See also notes 121-25 and

467. See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon,

Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond
Market Association), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage
Brokers).
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These concerns are not valid for two reasons.
First, because
origination is primarily a local function, the originator can and should be
responsible for compliance with local law. Second, originators and
investors in mortgage loans are already required to comply with a
patchwork of state laws; therefore, the cost of additional state law
restrictions will not become prohibitive.
1. Horizontal Segmentation of the Mortgage Market
Makes Compliance with State Law More Practical
Unlike earlier times, when mortgage markets were local, today's
mortgage market is a national, or even international market. Today, the
market is not segmented by locale, but rather by function, with the
ownership and investment functions existing separately from origination
and servicing. While capital comes into the mortgage market at a
national level, origination is still primarily a local function. Most
mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers have offices in the markets in
which they operate, particularly in the subprime market.
An investor in mortgages or mortgage-backed securities does not
have to know how to comply with local law, but may leave that function
to the originator. 468 Because most predatory lending issues arise at
origination, the originator, typically with a local office, should
appropriately be charged with state law compliance. Purchasers of
mortgages can and do protect themselves with buy-back requirementsrequirements that the originator buy back any loans that do not meet
certain standards. Therefore, losses related to non-compliance with state
law occur only when the originator is judgment proof or bankrupt.
Ultimately, purchasers of mortgages can protect themselves by carefully
selecting the originators with whom they do business.4 69
2. Lenders Already Comply with Varying State Requirements
Because real estate finance law has primarily been state law, a
patchwork of state law already exists. States differ in their mortgage
theories, 470 in the availability of and requirements for pre-foreclosure

468. Servicers also must comply with local law, but at a different stage of the process.
predatory lending issues arise at origination.

Most

469. This is one approach that Freddie Mac has used in its efforts to combat predatory lending.
See supranote 422 and accompanying text.
470. Three theories of mortgages exist in the United States-title theory, lien theory, and
intermediate theory. See Robert Kratovil, Mortgages-Problems in Possession, Rents, and Mortgage

2006]

MORTGAGING THE AMERICAN DREAM

1367

remedies,47 1 in the type of foreclosure permitted,4 72 in the logistics of
power of sale foreclosure where it is permitted,4 73 in the availability of a
deficiency,47 4 and in the availability and means of statutory redemption
after foreclosure.47 5 As a result, loan documents vary greatly from state
to state. Closing practices also vary from state to state with loan
closings typically handled by title companies in some states, by lenders
in other states, and by attorneys in still other states.47 6
Since lenders must already deal with this patchwork of laws and
practices in the various states, adding requirements under a predatory
lending statute is not as onerous is it would seem. Lenders must already
have separate loan documents, disclosure documents, closing
requirements, and closing practices for each state in which they do
business. Therefore, adding an additional state law variable should not
increase the cost to the extent that proponents of preemption claim.
Evidence exists that interest rates are relatively insensitive to the
Liability, 11 DEPAUL L. REV. 1,4-5 (1961). In title theory states, a mortgage lender is treated as having
title, in a sense, to the mortgaged property. Id. In lien theory states, a mortgage lender is treated as
having only a security interest in the mortgaged property and may not take possession until after
foreclosure. Id. In intermediate theory states, a mortgage lender has a hybrid interest, which gives the
lender the right to possession of the property after a default under the mortgage. Id. The majority of
states are lien theory states. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW
§ 4.2 (West Publishing Co. 2002) (1951).
471. In title theory states, the lender has the right, in theory, to possess the property at the time the
borrower executes the mortgage. As a practical matter, however, borrowers retain possession until
default by agreement with the lender. See NELSON &WHITMAN, supra note 470, § 4.1; see also MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 26 (2003) (giving the borrower a statutory right to possession until default
in the absence of an agreement to the contrary). In intermediate theory states, the lender has the right to
possession of the property after a default. Kratovil, supra note 470, at 4-5. In lien theory states, the
lender may only take possession after foreclosure. Id. at 5-6. However, many lien theory states permit
the lender to take possession of the property after default by agreement with the borrower. See, e.g.,
Kinnison v. Guar. Liquidating Corp., 115 P.2d 450, 452 (Cal. 1941); Topeka Sav. Ass'n v. Beck, 428
P.2d 779, 782 (Kan. 1967); Cent. Sav. Bank v. First Cadco Corp., 181 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Neb. 1970);
Carlquist v. Coltharp, 248 P. 481,483 (Utah 1926).
States differ in the requirements that a lender must meet in order to obtain the appointment of a
receiver, NELSON &WHITMAN, supra note 470, § 4.33, and in the effect given an assignment of rents.
Julia P. Forrester, A Uniform and More Rational Approach to Rents as Security for the Mortgage Loan,
46 RUTGERS L. REv. 349, 361-62 (1993).
472. About thirty states permit power of sale foreclosure, while the rest permit only judicial
foreclosure. See NELSON &WHITMAN, supra note 470, § 7.19.
473. See id. States vary greatly in their requirements for notice of a foreclosure sale, with
variations including the method of notice, the notice period, and the parties who must be given notice.
See id.
474. See id. § 8.1. Some states prohibit a deficiency judgment under certain circumstances, while
others limiting the amount of the deficiency. See id. § 8.3.
475. More than half of the jurisdictions have statutory redemption, but the specifics of the various
statutes vary greatly. Id. § 8.4.
476. See NELSON &WHITMAN, supra note 152, at 244.
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variation in state mortgage law.477 Additional protection for mortgagors
under state law does not increase interest rates to the extent that critics
have proposed.478 Therefore, considering the longstanding tradition of
state law in the areas of real estate and consumer protection, and
considering the advantages offered by giving states autonomy over
protecting their residents, preemption of state law is difficult to support.
F. The Role ofFederallySupported Lenders
1. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac currently operate within the
patchwork of state laws for real estate finance and the new predatory
lending laws, the GSEs have been criticized for their failure to "lead the
industry" in loans to low-income families and in low-income
neighborhoods. 4 79 Indeed, the GSEs should expand their role in leading
the industry by purchasing more than just A- subprime loans. Most
subprime borrowers fall into the A- category anyway, substantially
480
fewer into the B category, and fewer still in the C and D categories.
Therefore, a small presence in supporting loans in these lower categories
will have a larger impact on the markets for these loans.
In addition, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can lead the industry by
creating standards for subprime loans. One of the roles of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac in promoting the smooth operation of the housing
finance market has been to create sets of forms for home mortgage
lenders to use in the various states.48 ' In the prime market, even lenders
who do not intend to sell their loans to the GSEs tend to use these forms
because uniformity makes their loans more marketable on the secondary
market.4 82 In addition, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have created
automated underwriting systems for the prime market and, more
477. See Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of MortgagorProtection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV.
489, 491 (1991).
478. See id
479. See supra notes 423-25 and accompanying text.
480. The National Home Equity Mortgage Association reports that
makes up 60 percent, the "B" segment 30 percent, the "C" segment
segment I percent of the market. Inside B&C Lending reports that
makes up 73 percent, the "B" segment 13 percent, the "C" segment
segment 5 percent of the market.

the "A-minus"
9 percent, and
the "A-minus"
9 percent, and

segment
the "D"
segment
the "D"

HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 34.
481. See http://www.efanniemae.comi/sf/formsdocs/documents/; http://www.freddiemac.com/unifom/.
482. See Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 951, 971 (1997).
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recently, for A- subprime loans.483 The GSEs can further their goal of
leading the industry by producing forms for subprime loans that comply
with the patchwork of predatory lending laws and by creating
underwriting standards for subprime lending.
2. Federally Chartered Banks and Thrifts
Banks and thrifts argue that they have not been part of the predatory
lending problem and should, therefore, be exempt from state laws.
While few banks may have been directly involved in originating
predatory loans, they have been involved through affiliates, by
purchasing predatory loans and securities backed by predatory loans,
and by financing predatory lenders.484
Further, current federal
regulations exempting banks and their operating subsidiaries from the
operation of state predatory lending laws likely will make it easier for
banks to be involved in predatory lending. Banks can now move their
subprime lending operations into operating subsidiaries to avoid the
operation of state law, and banks themselves can purchase or take
security interests in predatory loans without fear of the assignee liability
provisions of state law. In fact, many bank-owned mortgage companies
are now organized as operating subsidiaries exempt from state law.4 85
Theoretically, the OCC will be monitoring banks to prevent predatory
lending abuses, but the OCC may not have the resources to monitor
activities of national banks and their operating subsidiaries. The OCC's
primary responsibility is to monitor the safety and soundness of national
banks and their affiliates.486 The agency is responsible for more than
1,900 national banks 487 and, in 2003, could not provide a list of their
operating subsidiaries because "the number and names of the operating
subsidiaries were constantly changing. 'A 88 Today, the OCC maintains a
list on its website of "many of the national bank operating subsidiaries
483. KENNETH TEMKIN, JENNIFER E.H. JOHNSON, DIANE LEVY, URBAN INST., U.S. DEP'T. OF
Hous. & URBAN DEV., SUBPRIME MARKETS, THE ROLE OF GSES, AND RISK-BASED PRICING vii, 21

(2002), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/subprime.pdf.
484. See supra notes 357-73 and accompanying text.
485. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OPERATING SUBSIDIARIES OF
NATIONAL BANKS (2006), http://www.occ.treas.gov/OpSublist.pdf. See also supra notes 355-56 and
accompanying text (discussing the preemption of state licensing and registration requirements for
operating subsidiaries of national banks).
486. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

OF THE CURRENCY,

ABOUT THE OCC (2005)

http://www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm.
487. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, NATIONAL BANKS ACTIVE AS OF

12/31/05 (2006) http://www.occ.treas.gov/foia/nblistName St CityBankNet.pdf.
488. NCLC COMMENTS, supra note 25, at 13 n.26.
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that do business directly with consumers. 4 89 In June 2006, the list
included the names of more than 300 companies, 490 but it is constantly
changing because bank holding companies reorganize their holdings on
a relatively frequent basis. 491 Furthermore, the agency may not have the
motivation to find and prosecute predatory lending abuses in the ranks
of the institutions it regulates because its funding comes primarily from
the assessments on the banks it regulates rather than from Congress.4 924 93
The OCC's preemption of state law is truly a "race to the bottom.1
By providing the most lenient regime for regulating predatory lending
practices, the OCC can encourage national banks to keep their federal
charters and state banks to switch to federal charters.4 94 Because the
OCC's budget is funded primarily by large national banks whose
interests are served by the preemption rule, the OCC can ensure the
preeminence of the national banking system. 495 This is further evidence
that the OCC will have little incentive to prosecute predatory lending
abuses among these institutions.
Banks and thrifts should be a part of the solution rather than being
part of the problem. They should be subject to state consumer
protection laws as the GSEs have been. Because banks and thrifts
receive the benefit of the federal safety net, they have a special
obligation to the public. They and their affiliates should be subject to
the same standards as other lenders.
VII. CONCLUSION
The federal government should not preempt state predatory lending
laws either through regulations applicable only to federally chartered
banks and thrifts or through legislation applicable to all lenders. Real
estate finance and consumer protection have traditionally been areas
489. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OPERATING SUBSIDIARIES OF NATIONAL
BANKS 1 (2006) http://www.occ.treas.gov/OpSublist.pdf.
490. See id
491. See NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., COMMENTS TO OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY,
DOCKET NO. 04-08, RULES, POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES FOR CORPORATE ACTIVITIES (ANNUAL
REPORT ON OPERATING SUBSIDIARIES) (2004), available at http://www.ncic.org/initiatives/
test and comm/04_26 04_ER.shtmi.
492. See ABOUT THE OCC, supranote 486.
493. William Cary's classic article describes Delaware's lenient corporation law as the result of its

success in a "race for the bottom." William Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974).
Delaware created a favorable climate for corporate
management in order to attract new business to the state. Id.

494. See Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 275.
495. See id.
at 276-79.
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governed by state law, and where the federal government has intervened
in these areas, federal statutes and regulations have typically created a
minimum standard for consumer protection rather than preempting the
field of regulation. When state governments regulate, they can be more
responsive to the needs of their citizens and innovative in trying new
solutions. Further, state enforcers are more likely to prosecute small
actors in predatory lending that federal enforcers may ignore.
Varying state laws are not as onerous on lenders as they may claim.
Since subprime loans tend to be originated by local mortgage bankers
and mortgage brokers, they can comply with local law, and investors can
police their originators and purchase only from those that comply with
local law. The states already have varying requirements for real estate
finance; therefore, adding additional requirements is only a matter of
revising forms and standards that already vary from state to state.
Furthermore, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can further their regulatory
goals of leading the industry in loans to low-income families and in lowincome neighborhoods by creating standards that originators can use to
comply with each state's law and by purchasing more subprime loans,
including loans to subprime borrowers with less than A- credit.
Banks, thrifts, and their affiliates have not earned the special
treatment they receive under new regulations. Furthermore, the OCC
does not have the resources or motivation to regulate national banks and
their operating subsidiaries to the extent they should be regulated.
Congress should override the OCC and OTS determinations that their
regulations preempt state predatory lending laws.
Federal attempts to curb the predatory lending problem have thus far
been inadequate and unsuccessful. The federal government should not
make the problem worse by tying the hands of state legislatures and
attorneys general who are trying to combat the problem. Federal
preemption, where state laws are more restrictive, simply adds fuel to
the fire by insulating predatory lenders from effective oversight and
sanctions. The federal government must stop mortgaging the American
dream.
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